### 1

#### One general law, leading to the advancement of all organic beings, namely, multiply, vary, let the strongest live and weakest die….[[1]](#footnote-1)

(Constitutional Rights Foundation, No Date, “BRIA 19 2 b Social Darwinism and American Laissez-faire Capitalism,” <https://www.crf-usa.org/bill-of-rights-in-action/bria-19-2-b-social-darwinism-and-american-laissez-faire-capitalism.html>)

"Society advances," Spencer wrote, "where its fittest members are allowed to assert their fitness with the least hindrance." He went on to argue that the unfit should "not be prevented from dying out." Unlike Darwin, Spencer believed that individuals could genetically pass on their learned characteristics to their children. This was a common, but erroneous belief in the 19th century. To Spencer, the fittest persons inherited such qualities as industriousness, frugality, the desire to own property, and the ability to accumulate wealth. The unfit inherited laziness, stupidity, and immorality. According to Spencer, the population of unfit people would slowly decline. They would eventually become extinct because of their failure to compete**.** The government, in his view, should not take any actions to prevent this from happening, since this would go against the evolution of civilization.

#### Evolution pulses through the bloodline of society. Survival is the prize and competition is its gatekeeper.

#### Queerness illuminates itself in the shadow of Darwinism demonstrating the mantra of “survival of the fittest” is not just a biological, but also social imperative. Whether it’s Pat Robertson’s statement that AIDS is “God’s way of weeding his garden,” or the attribution of queerness itself as a defect of “decadence,” queerness becomes the marker for society’s genocidal impulse to demonstrate that there are some populations that were born to die

Sedgwick 8 (Eve, Professor of English at Duke University, Epistemology of the Closet, second revised edition, California at Berkeley Press, p. 127-130)

From at least the biblical story of Sodom and Gomorrah, scenarios of same-sex desire would seem to have had a privileged, though by no means an exclusive, relation in Western culture to scenarios of both genocide and omnicide. That sodomy, the name by which homosexual acts are known even today to the law of half of the United States and to the Supreme Court of all of them, should already be inscribed with the name of a site of mass extermination is the appropriate trace of a double history. In the first place there is a history of the mortal suppression, legal or subjudicial, of gay acts and gay people, through burning, hounding, physical and chemical castration, concentration camps, bashing—the array of sanctioned fatalities that Louis Crompton records under the name of gay genocide, and whose supposed eugenic motive becomes only the more colorable with the emergence of a distinct, naturalized minority identity in the nineteenth century. In the second place, though, there is the inveterate topos of associating gay acts or persons with fatalities vastly broader than their own extent: if it is ambiguous whether every denizen of the obliterated Sodom was a sodomite, clearly not every Roman of the late Empire can have been so, despite Gibbon's connecting the eclipse of the whole people to the habits of a few. Following both Gibbon and the Bible, moreover, with an impetus borrowed from Darwin, one of the few areas of agreement among modern Marxist, Nazi, and liberal capitalist ideologies is that there is a peculiarly close, though never precisely defined, affinity between same-sex desire and some historical condition of moribundity, called "decadence," to which not individuals or minorities but whole civilizations are subject. Bloodletting on a scale more massive by orders of magnitude than any gay minority presence in the culture is the "cure," if cure there be, to the mortal illness of decadence. If a fantasy trajectory, utopian in its own terms, toward gay genocide has been endemic in Western culture from its origins, then, it may also have been true that the trajectory toward gay genocide was never clearly distinguishable from a broader, apocalyptic trajectory toward something approaching omnicide. The deadlock of the past century between minoritizing and universalizing understandings of homo/heterosexual definition can only have deepened this fatal bond in the heterosexist imaginaire. In our culture as in Billy Budd, the phobic narrative trajectory toward imagining a time after the homosexual is finally inseparable from that toward imagining a time after the human; in the wake of the homosexual, the wake incessantly produced since first there were homosexuals, every human relation is pulled into its shining representational furrow. Fragments of visions of a time after the homosexual are, of course, currently in dizzying circulation in our culture. One of the many dangerous ways that AIDS discourse seems to ratify and amplify preinscribed homophobic mythologies is in its pseudo-evolutionary presentation of male homosexuality as a stage doomed to extinction (read, a phase the species is going through) on the enormous scale of whole populations. 26 The lineaments of openly genocidal malice behind this fantasy appear only occasionally in the respectable media, though they can be glimpsed even there behind the poker-face mask of our national experiment in laissez-faire medicine. A better, if still deodorized, whiff of that malice comes from the famous pronouncement of Pat Robertson: "AIDS is God's way of weeding his garden." The saccharine luster this dictum gives to its vision of devastation, and the ruthless prurience with which it misattributes its own agency, cover a more fundamental contradiction: that, to rationalize complacent glee at a spectacle of what is imagined as genocide, a proto-Darwinian process of natural selection is being invoked—in the context of a Christian fundamentalism that is not only antievolutionist but recklessly oriented toward universal apocalypse. A similar phenomenon, also too terrible to be noted as a mere irony, is how evenly our culture's phobia about HIV-positive blood is kept pace with by its rage for keeping that dangerous blood in broad, continuous circulation. This is evidenced in projects for universal testing, and in the needle-sharing implicit in William Buckley's now ineradicable fantasy of tattooing HIV-positive persons. But most immediately and pervasively it is evidenced in the literal bloodbaths that seem to make the point of the AIDS-related resurgence in violent bashings of gays--which, unlike the gun violence otherwise ubiquitous in this culture, are characteristically done with two-by-fours, baseball bats, and fists, in the most literal-minded conceivable form of body-fluid contact.

#### The aff’s establishment of antitrust law is part and parcel of this Darwinian fantasy. Through the figure of Homo Economicus, financialization now serves as the primary regime of natural selection that dominates subjects into submission to ensure a neoliberal present and future. What’s needed now is not a refinement of our financial protocols but its abolition

McWhorter 12 (Ladelle McWhorter, James Thomas Professor of Philosophy and Professor of the Women's, Gender, and Sexualities Studies Program at the University of Richmond, “Queer Economies,” September 2012, Foucault Studies, No. 14)

The project of queering identities began in the early 1990s as a way of breaking down rigid delineations of experience and desire. Queer theorists pointed out numerous examples of ambiguous or veiled homosexual desire in apparently heterosexual images, tropes, characters, and plot lines in classical literature, drama, and film, as well as in popular culture. They showed us that our own real-life sexual and gender identities were simulacra, constantly requiring reenactment, reiteration, and representation to bolster and sustain themselves. They resisted and challenged homogeneity of identification by inciting identities to proliferate and endlessly differ from themselves. In short, where our normalized identities defined and imprisoned us, they excavated exits and melted bars. They showed us that those identities had histories and political investments and interests that transcended and sometimes opposed our individual lives and well-being. They laid bare the mechanisms of disciplinary normalization. They encouraged us to experience dis-identification and estrangement. In Foucault’s terms, they helped us to get free of ourselves.51Now, however, if disciplinary normalization is receding where it is in tension with expanding regimes of security wherein circulation (of money, commodities, information, human bodies, etc.), not development, is paramount, how are queer theory and politics situated? If “queer” resists the forces that would contain us in normalized identities, can “queer” also resist the forces that would transform us into utility maximizers operating as entrepreneurial firms? Or is it more likely just to render us all more open to marketing across what used to be our normalized identity boundaries? The question is pressing because, on some fronts at least, it looks like queering identities facilitates the expansion and multiplication of markets. To attract a desired mate, a straight man might need to invest in his human capital by learning from—and then by purchasing the same products as—men with fashionable “queer eyes,” as depicted on an early twenty-first century reality TV show, “Queer Eye for the Straight Guy.” Straight masculinity needs to be softened or refined; hence, a little queerness is good for everybody. In some queer youth cultures, boundary breaking and gender-bending strategies rely very heavily on deploying purchased products; one announces one’s challenges to identification through clothes, jewelry, hair styles, tattoos, personal electronics, and similar accoutrements and often through relatively rapid changes in these modes of personal stylization. After all, in a neoliberal world, what does refusing to be contained in an identity mean other than refusing to make consistent consumer choices? It will be argued that this popular culture appropriation of “queer” has little or nothing to do with the queer politics of the 1970s and 1980s or with the queer theory and politics of the 1990s. And there is merit in that argument. My point is not that the work done in those decades was misguided, only that, with the changes in notions of identity that have occurred with the advance of neoliberalism over the last four decades, that sort of work now will inevitably be appropriated and, to use a very old word, co-opted. It does not challenge neoliberal subjectivities directly enough not to be; its focus was disciplinary normalization. But can we turn queering into resisting neoliberalism? I believe so, and I believe we should. First, why should we? I will not make a comprehensive argument here. Instead, like Foucault in the first lecture of the 1977-1978 series, I will assert a “conditional imperative” 52: If we want to resist domination, if we want to resist the current political tendency to lock people down in a single grid of intelligibility and mode of living (and surely that is essentially what queer politics and queer theory have aimed to oppose all along), then in addition to resisting what remains of normalized disciplinary identities, we must resist and challenge the neoliberal reduction of people to calculating, self-interested entrepreneurs of themselves. This is the way of thinking and approaching life that we all are being pressed into within neoliberal regimes of power. For those few who actually succeed in turning themselves into self-entrepreneurs, viewing every aspect of their existence in terms of competition, investment, and profitable exchange, such a life is likely to be impoverished in every way except financial. And for those who fail—which is likely to be a large majority of people on our planet, including a majority of North Americans and Europeans—the material, if not also the psychological, results are little short of terrifying. What we must queer now, I believe, is not so much normalized identity but neoliberal subjectivity. If neoliberalism is able to impose its conception of human being fully, the world will be a much worse place, in my view, than it is now. Relationships, including communal and civic relationships, will be devalued to the breaking point, and material scarcity in the absence of those relationships will drive people to desperation. So, how can we queer neoliberal subjectivity? Queering, like queer “itself,” never appears in unity. There will be many approaches and possibilities, and they will not obey common distinctions between theory and practice. With that word of caution, I will conclude this essay by discussing three closely related courses of action. The first begins with a policing of our language. Let us pause and consider each time we find ourselves about to describe an action as an “investment.” This, I think, would be the first step in resisting the neoliberal financialization of lives and selves. Sometimes people do invest, such as when they allocate some of their incomes to 401(k)s. But why think of taking classes as “investing”? Why think of maintaining one’s home as “an investment”? Why think of getting to know colleagues at conferences as “investments”? There are other ways to describe these activities. In fact, all these things usually involve some pleasure in the moment and have many desirable effects besides increasing one’s net worth in the marketplace. Interrogating the use of financial language in everyday life is crucial for identifying the ways in which neoliberal discourses and values are shaping us and our relationships. I suspect, furthermore, that a sustained resistance to financial language might also lead us eventually to undertake a critique of neoliberal temporality with its multiple postponements into an apparently unending futurity of projected returns.53 A second, probably closely related practice of resistance to neoliberal domination might begin with simply taking note of desires and pleasures that are neither market-based nor market-valued. Non-(re)productive sexuality might be a prime example, as might friendship and communal relationships outside the kinship systems that are taken to be the fundamental units of capitalist consumption. To be sure, there are ways of construing such things in market terms if we choose to, as Gary Becker’s work makes clear, but if we pay close attention to what really brings us joy in those activities and relationships and find ways of expressing that joy or pleasure or desire in non-financial and non-market terms, collectively we may generate a basis upon which to live in resistance to neoliberal domination. Finally, in addition to examining the ways we speak of our own actions in everyday life and the ways we understand and live in relation to others, we might actually take a more activist stand against gay and lesbian market identities. By this I mean something more than simply challenging stereotypes, which has been done for decades. I mean, also, challenging the gay and lesbian organizations that promote our communities as markets and that buy into the idea that what justice for all amounts to is assimilation into the dominate market economy. Let me quickly add that I am not advocating a withdrawal from market economies (I believe that would be impossible), nor am I suggesting that we relinquish the gains made against discrimination in employment. Instead, I am suggesting, in a Foucauldian vein, that we problematize those goals and do what we can to render them questionable. As David Harvey wrote recently, “We are, often without knowing it, all neoliberals now.” 54 We have already been re-shaped to a great extent, and alternatives to neoliberal language and concepts are no longer readily available. But they can emerge if the radical contingency of our own ways of being make themselves felt in our questioning. In other words, alternatives can form and domination can be opposed through an antineoliberal practice of queer.

#### The aspiration for greater competition law cannot be separated from the image of the nuclear family. The trope of the “corporate family” who was “organized around a family business”[[2]](#footnote-2) is the unspoken basis of Neo-Brandeisian economics that atomizes intimacy and care to biological kin. This enshrines a social network bent on the alienation of queer communities and communities of color calcifying permanent disparities

Drucker 15 (Peter Drucker, Editor of Against the Current, “Warped: Gay Normality and Queer Anti-Capitalism,” 2015)

Chapter 3 summed up the new gay normality in five features. As the introduction noted earlier, and as chapter 5 will explore in depth, the key imperatives of a radical queer sexual politics can be identified in opposition to those five features, point by point. Graphical user interface, text

Description automatically generated The five features of a radical queer sexual politics are not yet accomplished facts; they are still tasks to be tackled, dimensions to be fleshed out. While queer radicalism is inherently a politics of sexual liberation – which is the queerest thing about it – a queer politics has to involve more than being visibly, defiantly sexual in queer ways. Each of the five tasks for a queer politics has to take shape in organising tactics, as well as changes in personal and community life. To achieve full sexual liberation, a queer politics has to challenge and win power at the level of the economy, state and other sites where power is concentrated. Without a strategic project, queer radicalism dooms itself to perpetual marginality. Queer politics in this sense has barely begun to be invented. Defining queer politics in this way contradicts common-sense thinking about sexuality, and what has largely become common sense even among radical queers. For capitalist cultures organised around the divide between public and private, the sexual is pre-eminently private. Radical queers disagree, of course; we understand that heterosexuality is publicly ‘flaunted’ every day, and that genuine queer equality demands bringing queer sex into the public sphere and insisting on its public recognition.1 But most queers see the sexual as predominantly cultural. Disgusted with what passes for politics under neoliberal hegemony and leaning towards a wholesale anarchist rejection of the politics of large-scale organisations and state institutions, many queers see sexual politics as a domain of individual or small-group action and cultural production. Inventing a true queer politics must begin by challenging this dichotomy and refuting this fallacy. The cultural and the personal do not exist in a separate realm apart from the economic, the political and the social; they are constantly deployed and manipulated by the powers that be to produce economic, political and social outcomes that are in their interests. ‘Neoliberalism was constructed in and through cultural and identity politics’, as Lisa Duggan has pointed out. Moreover, radical cultural and personal change is only possible by transforming the state, economy and other structures that form the foundation of cultural and personal life, at both the micro level of individuals and small groups and the macro level of the city, nation, region and planet. Transformation will not be possible as long as ‘cultural and identity issues are separated, analytically and organizationally, from the political economy in which they are embedded’.2 An agenda for a radical sexual politics therefore has to address multiple cultural, social, economic and political issues. In subverting gender, it has to be closely connected to a socialist feminist programme for reproductive freedom. In practising queer inclusion and global and anti-racist solidarity, it needs to focus on cutting-edge struggles like those of queer youth and trans people, and solidarity campaigns against Islamophobia, cuts in aid to poor countries and the ‘pinkwashing’ of Israel as a pro-gay state. At the same time, it should start from visions of queer intimacy and ‘families of choice’ to define a radical yet unifying approach to the issue of same-sex partnership. This means opposing the privatisation of care and the transmission of class privilege, while exploring new ways of supporting parents and creating flexible forms for intimate relationships. Blurring the Boundaries Today there is a push in many countries to incorporate lesbian, gay, bisexual and even trans people into the prevailing sexual and family order. That order is structured under gendered capitalism by having the vast majority of children raised and socialised by at least one biological parent in families formed by sexually and romantically linked heterosexual couples. Particularly in regions where the nuclear family has been consolidated as the predominant capitalist household form, these are the families in which the great majority of lgbt children grow up. This means that at best, even in the most supposedly enlightened enclaves, lgbt people are bound to face a period of differentiation and alienation in coming to terms with their distinct identity. Their own process of family formation is bound to be exceptional and complex. In short, the best this order can offer lgbt people is a kind of second-class citizenship. lgbt lives in this situation entail a constant choice between, or more accurately a varying combination of, adaptation and ghettoisation. Most lgbt people can only survive, let alone prosper, by doing waged work in heteronormative companies or institutions. Their survival is made easier if they find steady partners who also have steady jobs, and even easier if they both have reasonably supportive heterosexual family networks to fall back on. But work and family life of this kind involves a constant process of adaptation, of having or failing to correct spoken or unspoken assumptions and weighing one’s own words and gestures. Even the places where most people spend their free time are heteronormative – witness the hostility evoked by queer kiss-ins in straight bars and sometimes by any public signs of same-sex affection. This is not necessarily a reflection of straight people’s prejudice or unwillingness to understand; it is simply the result of the heteronormative ways in which life is structured. So most lgbt people escape from the dominant forms of work, family and leisure or complement them with life in a separate lgbt world, made up of more or less mainstream gay bars, clubs and associations, and more or less alternative queer and trans scenes. Even in the absence of prejudice or discrimination, this is what gay normality consists of: a combination of life in a heteronormative world and retreat into an lgbt ghetto. In contrast to the homonormative model of lesbian/gay people as a minority caught between adaptation and ghettoisation, a queer radical politics can look to a future beyond the gay/straight binary. This is in keeping with the early objectives of lesbian/gay liberation, and with Herbert Marcuse’s vision of a generalised freeing up of human eroticism. It is in lgbt people’s interests to contest the heteronormative order and develop alternatives to it: not just a queerer ghetto, but communities beyond norms and ghettos. Radical queers challenge the social frontiers between gay and straight in different ways. One way is simply acting sexually in ways or settings that transgress society’s heterosexual norm – same-sex tongue-kissing in straight singles bars, for example. They assert what Scott Tucker once called ‘our right to the world’.3 The full range of issues and adversaries that they take on comes across in the list of focus groups that Queer Nation San Francisco had at its height: the streets; the media; the military; government institutions; universities; suburban malls; communities of colour; other countries

#### Reject their call to rally around the spectacle of extinction – it’s rooted in a eugenic project that valorizes reproduction as survival, which embraces a heterosexual future at the expense of queers in the present

Feit 2005. Extinction Anxieties: Same-Sex Marriage and Modes of Citizenship[Feit, Mario.](http://muse.jhu.edu.libweb.lib.utsa.edu/search/results?action=search&searchtype=author&section1=author&search1=%22Feit,%20Mario.%22)Theory & Event, Volume 8, Issue 3, 2005. Asst. Prof.. George Mason University

Why this **doomsday rhetoric**, which outpaces and exceeds the likely consequences of same-sex marriage? Because same-sex marriage calls into question the perpetuation of community *in the face of mortality*. In one case, **reproduction of community** quite literally **is understood as *sexual* reproduction of community**; homosexuality in this instance is presented as lethal because it is non-reproductive.Queer opposition to marriage, on the other hand, presents marriage as a lethal force to a community that does not raise its succeeding generations. In this case, **the fear is that an instrument of heteronormativity overwhelms precarious queer processes of socialization and regeneration.** In short, both **arguments are concerned with the perpetuation of community in light of the absence of** gay sexual **reproduction**.[4](http://muse.jhu.edu.libweb.lib.utsa.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.3feit.html#_edn4)  Why are these anxieties about the preservation of existing modes of citizenship across time anxieties about mortality? **Because citizenship -- world-making of any kind -- is always also about coping with human finitude**, as Zygmunt Bauman points out: **Such a life** -- life **forgetful of death,** life **lived as meaningful and worth living,** life alive with purposes instead of being crushed and incapacitated by purposelessness -- **is a formidable *human* achievement. The totality of social organization, the whole of human culture** (not certain functionally specialized institutions, nor certain functionally specialized cultural precepts) **cooperate to make this achievement possible.**[5](http://muse.jhu.edu.libweb.lib.utsa.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.3feit.html#_edn5)  Bauman emphasizes that concern with death and efforts to give meaning to life by transcending death are not to be understood as religious matters, i.e. as falling within the provenance of certain ethical dispositions or cultural institutions. Many aspects of culture, which apparently bear no relation to existential consolation, are very much concerned with it. Indeed, they become highly effective inasmuch the aspiration to transcend death remains unarticulated.[6](http://muse.jhu.edu.libweb.lib.utsa.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.3feit.html#_edn6)  **Anything that appears to challenge the perpetuation of community evokes the fear of death**. This is why both straight and gay opponents react so intensely to same-sex marriage **-- they fear the extinction of the form of community that provides them with existential consolation**. For straight opponents, George Weinberg's explanation is salient: "**The** notion that there are homosexuals **distresses some people because the thought of persons without children reawakens their fear of death**. Today in the larger population, vicarious immortality through having children and grandchildren assuages the spirit of millions and blunts the edge of mortality for them. **Our great glorification of reproduction, with all the customs and modes that advance it, serves in part as a ceremony to circumvent death as if by magic**."[7](http://muse.jhu.edu.libweb.lib.utsa.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.3feit.html#_edn7) My argument elaborates how Weinberg's point applies to the debate on same-sex marriage, and expands it to include queer critiques of marriage. In the latter case, queer cultural practices and politics -- chiefly, finding alternatives to marriage -- function as the "children" who provide existential consolation, that is, allow for the conclusion: "He died, but his work lives on."[8](http://muse.jhu.edu.libweb.lib.utsa.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.3feit.html#_edn8)  My argument, though based on a comparison, does not attribute equal ethical weight to the two sides. To the contrary, I am indebted to queer theory's critique of heteronormativity, and consider my argument as a contribution to queer theory. This contribution is two-fold: first, **I hope to flesh out** one account of heteronormativity that is largely neglected, namely **heteronormativity's reliance on the fear of death. The association of homosexuality with death** is not exhausted by homophobic discourses on HIV/ AIDS. It precedes the emergence of AIDS. As Paul Morrison notes, "the epidemic has resolved, rather than occasioned, a crisis in signification: the crisis that has always been gay sexuality itself...The cultural function of AIDS has been to stabilize, through a specifically narrative or novelistic logic, the truth of gay identity as death or death wish."[9](http://muse.jhu.edu.libweb.lib.utsa.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.3feit.html#_edn9) Gay men are considered "a population doomed to extinction, anyway."[10](http://muse.jhu.edu.libweb.lib.utsa.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.3feit.html#_edn10)This logic of lethal homosexuality relies on the childlessness of homosexuality, and thus concerns both lesbians and gay men. **It is this underlying association of sexual reproduction with immortality and citizenship**, which I emphasize in the discussion that follows.

#### Thus, vote neg to adopt queer desire – traditional economic study creates a disembodied and apathetic politic that enables the extermination of those deemed unqualified or refuse participation. Only the alt shifts from a competitive to a cooperative paradigm that transforms social life itself

Heilger 15 (Evangeline Heilger, Mellon Visiting Assistant Professor of Public Discourse in American Sudies at Smith College, “Possibilities of Queer Desires and Economic Bodies (Because ‘The Economy’ Is Not Enough),” GlassHouse Book, 2015)

Working in ‘the economy’ alone couldn’t satisfy our needs. It still cannot. Trashpicking is just one example of an economic innovation by poor, queer, and working-class people in response to laws and policies that ignore the needs of marginalized folks. Yet rarely are these innovations acknowledged in traditional economic study; they become visible only as ‘alternatives to’ capitalism, and only if economic gains are quantifiable. In development studies, such activities are denigrated as ‘economies of affection’, viewed within that framework as a cause for poverty and a hindrance to progress (Escobar 1995; Scott 1996). The full range of economic activities enacted by poor, queer, and working-class people is missing from economic analysis. As noted by Binnie, class is an analytic of power by which people are differentiated from one another on the basis of differential access to material inequalities. Binnie argues for the integration of class into an intersectional analysis of sexuality, and an integration of sexuality into an intersectional analysis of class. This chapter answers Binnie’s call by utilizing an intersectional sexuality–class analysis of different economic innovations by poor, queer, and working-class folks. I have a queer desire. I want to convince you that there are worlds of economic activities that go unnoticed in traditional economic study. My goal is to explain the benefits of those ‘other activities’ – the alternative capitalist and noncapitalist activities – despite their being marked as ‘outside’ wage-earning capitalism. I want you to value them because they matter to people’s survival. To do this, I have to blend some strangely personal queer, poor, and working-class stories with a scholarly attempt to dethrone ‘the economy’ as a unified, closed system. Economic bodies: multiplying vulnerable desires I argue that queer desires inspire people to engage in clusters of nonnormative economic arrangements. These clusters of economic activity can best be understood metaphorically as ‘economic bodies’. I imagine these economic bodies engaging the world much like living and nonliving bodies interacting with other living and nonliving bodies. They take in nutrients and excrete waste. They create and destroy, mimic and hide, hibernate, reproduce, and die (although not necessarily in that order).2 One could consider capitalism as one type of economic body, although certainly not the only type. Economic bodies consist of people, tools, equipment, technical devices, algorithms, as well as non-human substances (e.g. food, plants, minerals, currencies), and actions such as labor, exchanges, and gifting. Economic bodies can exist at a large scale, similarly to how ‘capitalism’ is conceived, or at smaller scales such as micro-economies, families, groups, and individuals.3 The relationships of and between economic bodies can be understood only through engaging a radical analysis that incorporates intersectional analytics of power, including but not limited to gender, race/ethnicity, class, sexuality, nationality, embodiment, and other structural forms of power.4 Why not then use the term ‘actor’ as developed by Callon and Latour in actornetwork theory (also known as ANT)5 (Callon and Latour 1981; Callon 1986, 2005; Latour 1987, 2005)? Latour’s ‘actor’ calls to mind a human being who acts in relation to others, and whose actions can only be understood in connection to others, similarly to how I describe economic bodies functioning relationally to other bodies. Callon describes ‘actors’ as being made up of ‘human bodies but also of prostheses, tools, equipment, technical devices, algorithms, etc.’ (Callon 2005: 4). My description of economic bodies again aligns, although it elaborates further. My observations of green, queer, and alternative economies (Heiliger 2011, 2012, 2013) leads me to articulate three reasons to use the metaphor of ‘bodies’ in this chapter – rather than ‘actor’, ‘economy’, or ‘economic actor’ – to describe an assemblage of people, parts, relationships, and actions that make up economic activities: (1) to pluralize and multiply economic systems; (2) to emphasize the vulnerability of the human bodies living and working under conditions of structural inequality;6 and (3) to utilize the power of metaphor to insert images of vulnerable economies in the minds of readers. While ANT allows for a multiplying and plurality of economies via its concept of ‘networks’, in which multiple ‘actors’ can (inter)act, ANT does not meet the other two characteristics of green/queer/ alternative economies.7 My purpose in using ‘bodies’ as a metaphor is to call to mind both the humans included in economic activities and their vulnerability, a vulnerability mirrored in economic bodies. In Precarious Life, feminist and queer scholar Judith Butler writes that the vulnerability of our bodies is what connects us to one another. Our bodies signal ‘dependency, vulnerability, agency: the skin and flesh expose us to the gaze of others, but also to touch and to violence’ (2004: 26). This vulnerability of bodies is also what creates porousness: a body’s capacity to help and to harm, to be assisted and to be hurt is interwoven with the dependency of bodies (Butler 2004). Economic bodies are equally vulnerable, a point which I address later in this section. I pluralize the metaphor of body, using ‘economic bodies’ (rather than economic body) to counter powerful existing metaphors that promote the idea of a singular, unified, economic totality such as ‘the body of Capitalism’ and ‘the Market’. In making this argument, I align with Gibson-Graham (1996, 2006) in recognizing multiple forms of capitalism and the need to partially dis-unify the powerful ideology of ‘the economy’ or ‘Capitalism’ as a closed system. I also draw on embodiment theorists in recognizing the porousness of bodies, and on queer theorists to articulate how queer desires are pursued through economic bodies. The communal, polymorphous, intersubjective components of queer, feminist, and embodiment theories amplify the metaphor of ‘bodies’. The communal, polymorphous, and intersubjective components also diffuse the idea of a monolithic economic process such as ‘the market’ or ‘capitalism’ into easily recognizable clusters of activity. It becomes possible to see my mother’s teaching job, neighborhood foodsharing, charity clothing donations, and trashpicking as a connected cluster of economic activity that enabled my family’s survival, rather than as a capitalist economic activity (teaching job) and several alternative capitalist and noncapitalist activities. Therefore, reading this metaphor of economic bodies through recent scholarship allows a more complex picture of multiple economic processes, particularly those utilized by poor and other marginalized people as survival strategies. It may appear that the difference between ‘body’ and ‘bodies’ as an economic metaphor is so slight as to be insignificant. Yet recent studies by cognitive scientists Thibodeau and Boroditsky (2011, 2013) demonstrate that even slight, oneword differences in the metaphor used to describe a social or political issue can have profound impacts upon decision-making processes by individuals. Metaphors influence the kinds of solutions we think of and also direct us towards solutions that are consistent with the metaphor (Thibodeau and Boroditsky 2011). Furthermore, metaphors influence our thinking whether or not we are explicitly aware of the metaphor’s role in our decision-making process (Thibodeau and Boroditsky 2013). Therefore, I argue that those who consider all economic activities part of a singular, unified entity such as ‘the economy’ will seek out economic solutions for a singular, unified economy, convinced these are the best solutions regardless of data. If the same people are willing to think of economies as bodies – as lots of different kinds of ‘people’ moving through the world interacting with other ‘people’ – they will look for economic solutions that meet the needs of diverse people who will function best by interacting with others to meet their needs.8 I propose bodies as a metaphor for economies because human bodies are not closed systems; they have complex interactions with other bodies and their environments via border crossings of flesh and consciousness ‘more porous than previously imagined’ (Grosz 2001). My family’s intimate engagement with other people’s refuse is one example of blurred boundaries: between us and other families; between work-for-pay and nonmarket activity; and between what no longer has possibility (trash) and what newly has possibility (trash-turned-treasure). Klapeer and Schönpflug concept of ‘queer commons’ in Chapter 9 of this volume illustrates the porous boundaries of human bodies more fully. If one considers identity as something formed in relation to others, rather than owned by one’s individual self – as argued by Klapeer and Schönpflug – then my family’s class identity and my mother’s queer desires formed in relation to multiple others, both within and adjacent to our class. Human contact is porous in its overlaps: fingerprints left on trash meet fingerprints on trash-turned-treasure,9 creating liminal spaces where my family’s queerly classed identity was formed and re-formed. We interacted with one another as family members sharing the same material and social resources, and we brushed up against those whose trash became a means to my family’s desires and survival. Moira Gatens (1996) argues that the permeability and transitivity of human bodies is possible with any ‘body’ with which we have an affective relation, including corporate social bodies. Pushing out from Gatens, I suggest that economic bodies, as a form of social body, are controlled through human forces, behave in human ways, actively engage with other economic bodies, and utilize forms of social control and power. Bodies are vulnerable to racism, sexism, homophobia, xenophobia, and ableism (Butler 2004), which serve neoliberal aims through their visual and discursive association both with certain human bodies and with nonnormative economic bodies. Nonnormative economic bodies include intelligent, deliberate, and relationship-making processes such as bartering, gifting, trading, careshift collectives, trashpicking, and repurposing. However, these economic activities are frequently racialized, feminized, eroticized, and colonized, imagined in economic discourse as geographically located in the global south or in ‘inferior’ areas of the global north (e.g. inner-city urban or lower-class rural) (Escobar 1995). What we imagine about bodies interrelates with the socio-historic formations of economic realities and current understandings of economic ‘truth’. Thus stereotypes about human bodies are transferred onto what we imagine about economic bodies, and imaginings about economic bodies cross the borders of ‘social bodies’ and become soaked up by the sponginess of the diverse human bodies that labor in the environments of that particular economic body. The bodies of the people in an economy – in an economic body – create meaning for that economy. What we imagine about bodies, our own and others’, has powerful effects on how we relate to those bodies. This transitivity of bodies from material to imagined and back again in simultaneous time, combined with the spongelike ability of bodies to hold multiple meanings, is what I refer to here as the porousness of bodies, both human and economic. How then might we use this porousness of bodies to imagine and engage in productively promiscuous economies? I take up this question in this chapter, offering five examples of porously queer economies that function like human bodies:10 a single-mother desiring beautiful furniture, art, and possibility despite living in poverty; a homeless person making a livelihood on their own terms; medically altering one’s body to better match one’s gender regardless of age or ability to pay; moving cross-country despite being told that persons with disabilities ought to be satisfied with their current living situations; and creating social healing through cultivating queer black intergenerational community across state lines and in the absence of legal ties. I demonstrate that these queer desires inspire complex weavings of market, alternative market, and nonmarket economic activities. These blended activities in pursuit of queer desires are what I call ‘queer economies’. Queer economies I define queer economies as economic bodies animated by queer desires. J. Jack Halberstam defines queerness as referring ‘to nonnormative logics and organizations of community, sexual identity, embodiment, and activity in space and time’ (2005: 6). The ‘queer’ part of queer desires, in this chapter, signals desires shaped by nonnormative logics of community, sexual identity, embodiment, and activity – including economic processes – in space and time. When queer desires motivate economic bodies, we can see that queer economies are shaped and moved by human bodies pursuing queer desires. Because queer economies blend economic activities, these kinds of economic bodies have radical potential for transformation, extending options to survive and thrive through deliberately relational activities such as bartering, trading, careshift collectives, and trashpicking. Another feature of queer economies is their engagement with the erotic. In her seminal essay ‘Toward a Queer Ecofeminism’ (1997), Greta Gaard articulates how Western culture’s devaluing of women, nature, and colonized peoples parallels a devaluation of both queerness and the erotic. Scholars such as Arturo Escobar (1995) and Catherine Scott (1996) have made similar claims that economic development discourse conceptually connects nature, women, indigenous people, and colonized nations. Given Gaard’s eco-feminist theorization that colonization projects attempting to stamp out queer expressions of gender and sexuality simultaneously created a fear of the erotic (1997), I am intrigued by the idea that erotophobia might be preventing us from valuing a range of economic bodies. Can we conceive of nonnormative economies as queerly erotic bodies, sparking and enflaming queer desires? I can imagine them flaming, butch, dyke, crip, leather, trans\*, closeted, polyamorous – even dandy! Yet I wish also to include ‘punks’ and ‘welfare queens’ amongst these queerly defined and imagined economic bodies that inspire queer desire (Cohen 1997: 438). For Cathy J. Cohen, using ‘queer’ politically allows for an expansive definition of identities linked to sexuality, labor, and visibility, a definition that includes those who blur gender/ sexual boundaries as well as unmarried mothers or youth who reject capitalism in favor of anarchy. When our queer economies rub up against the skin of other queer economies, there lies powerful potential for desire and economy outside the (re)productive. I suspect many forms of queer economy go unnoticed because they represent refusals to ‘sleep with’ or ‘be faithful to’ a white hetero-malecapitalism. Thus, just as lesbians and queer women may be punished for refusing sexual availability to heteronormative demands, so too are queer economies deplored, ignored, and decimated for cheeky ‘failures’ to live up to capitalist expectations of profit, efficiency, and progress. One example of a ‘failure’ to properly engage capitalism is that of contemporary trashpickers in LA County. They are typecast as homeless, male, dirty, and incapable of making rational decisions for their own well-being.11 Yet evidence about scavenging demonstrates that at least some of those assumptions are false: collecting recyclables is a consistent means to make money. It requires skill and awareness, planning and follow-through. Trashpicking also requires patience and a certain amount of strength and mobility, although it doesn’t have to be one’s own legs or arms – wheelchairs and grabber-sticks are useful tools (Farrell 2006). Scavenging can be effective in teams or solo, or by collaborating with someone for company while collecting for oneself. Trashpicking allows for making a livelihood on one’s own terms outside of or in addition to work for pay. I list trashpicking as evidence of queer economy, partly because my own queer survival has depended upon it. I see it in action in every place I have ever traveled or lived. Trash also brushes uncomfortably against the erotic, frequently cast in moral terms as a judgment: as dirty, unclean, something to be discarded and not thought about again. Those who engage in close, embodied contact with trash are categorized in the same way as the trash itself: disposable, unclean, and certainly not compatible with a middle- or upper-class status. At the same time, the embrace of ‘trashiness’ in popular culture – understood as a gendered and sexualized cultural performance – leaves me loath to romanticize trashpicking. It is dirty work, but hardly immoral: one might even argue that repurposing keeps valuable resources out of landfills and reduces greenhouse gasses, thereby improving local environments. This is where feminist, queer, and antiracist theories help us to see the language and practices used to denigrate particular human bodies. I propose that when we hear sexist, racist, ableist, classist, homophobic, or trans\*phobic comments, there is an opportunity to observe queer economies that challenge the unity, singularity, and totality of ‘capitalism’. Why do I suggest that economies function like bodies? Contemporary English-language economic discourse frequently touts both the singularity of economy – ‘the economy is sick’ – and economy’s presumed human qualities – ‘the economy is sick’. Existing descriptions of economies as gendered, racialized, disabled, and otherwise anthropomorphized in human terms bolster my claim that economies are already conceived at least partially in embodied terms. The anthropomorphized terms rely on a Western framework that values certain ‘masculine-affiliated’ qualities over ‘feminine-affiliated’ others. Catherine Scott illuminates that the gendered nature of economic discourse is fundamental to imbuing imperial and capitalist regimes with unearned power (1995: 4). Yet within this gendered, anthropomorphized language is ‘the economy’s’ Achilles heel. The tendency to anthropomorphize ‘the economy’ also serves to break down an image of the economy as singular: ‘the’ economy is variously described as masculine, feminine, hard, soft, sick, dying, racialized, reproducing, and lazy. In paying attention to such discourses, one can only conclude that ‘the economy’ consistently changes genders, has multiple personalities, or is not as singular in form as dominant hegemonic discourse would lead us to think. Each of these scenarios holds promise for imagining multiple, diverse economic bodies. Those invested in racism, sexism, ableism, erotophobia, heteronormativity, nationalisms, and colonial power are likely to take my suggestion that there are as many kinds of economies as there are types of human bodies as proof of the superiority of capital ‘c’ Capitalism (Gibson-Graham 1996), much as they take for granted the privileges and power granted to bodies upholding whiteness, maleness, wholeness, productivity, reason, heterosexism, the nation-state, and imperialism. My argument is not for them. I suggest thinking of economies as bodies so that those invested in valuing a range of diverse human bodies and relationships can claim our queer economies – our labors in service of queer desires – with the same ferocity that we claim our diverse, queer selves. Benefits of economic bodies The need for an ‘economies as bodies’ framework grew out of my research on two brands from so-called ‘ethical trade’: Café Femenino® and Product (Red)™ (Heiliger 2011, 2012, 2013). These brands and their campaigns are examples of a larger ‘ethical consumerism’ trend in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, which is a social and economic phenomenon encouraging shoppers, primarily in the global North, to buy products that claim to make the world a better place for all. Gibson-Graham’s dismantling of monolithic ‘Capitalism’ into ‘capitalisms’ (1996) proved critical for describing ways Café Femenino’s Fair Trade economic processes differed from Product (Red)’s version of shopping for a social justice cause. However, once I began to analyse economic activities that blended market, alternative market, and nonmarket transactions, Gibson-Graham’s (1996, 2006) framework of diverse economies no longer effectively described what I observed. One flaw in Gibson-Graham’s description of diverse economies is its limited framing of diverse economies as consisting of transactions/labor/ enterprise, which are conceived as taking place in one of three places: (1) markets, (2) alternative markets, or (3) nonmarkets. Depending upon how economic exchanges are compensated, Gibson-Graham categorize economic activities as either (1) capitalist, (2) alternative capitalist, or (3) noncapitalist. Yet economic bodies do not fit neatly into any one of these categories as strictly capitalist, alternative capitalist, or noncapitalist. Instead, diverse economic bodies – including queer economies – overlap different areas of Gibson-Graham’s framework. The actions of economic bodies may include a combination of capitalist, alternative capitalist, and noncapitalist activities. Here, the metaphor of porousness is useful for understanding the ways that queer economies do not have defined boundaries around market, alternative market, and nonmarket activities. Rather, all three of these activities intermingle in queer economies to support nonnormative people as they pursue queer desires for surviving, thriving, and justice. Gibson-Graham’s framework of diverse economies may not preclude the matrix of queer economies. However, it does not adequately theorize the ways queer economies mix economic activities in pursuit of specific queer desires. Contemporary forms of trade such as ethical consumerism are a merger of capitalisms and alternatives such as Fair Trade (Heiliger 2011; Barnett et al. 2008). Instead of describing Café Femenino as functioning under a ‘subsystem of capitalism’ or Product (Red) as ‘a more ethical capitalism’, the framework of economic bodies catalogues each as its own economic body. Both are new economic bodies formed through an economic marriage. These are two different economies that have adapted quickly in response to critiques of globalization, and which play with one another on a global scale, as well as in local markets. In the coffee world, certified Fair Trade became more entrenched in legal documentation, a result that some considered a hindrance to the transformative possibilities of Fair Trade. In response, other forms of ‘ethical’ trade such as transparent contracts and direct trade spun off from Fair Trade and formed their own economic bodies, some of which continue to engage with formal, certified Fair Trade. Other economic bodies previously considered alternative have modified to more closely resemble conventional trade (e.g. Silk brand soy products). Economic offspring form just as human ones do: through unions sometimes clandestine, occasionally sexy, possibly expensive, but generally without much of note to alert the media. This merger of ideological interests (if not actual practices) and social justice concerns is strange. It strikes me that current bodies of ethical economies operate a bit like idealized liberal American upwardly mobile heterosexual couples: practical, yet kind. When I am asked to comment on Fair Trade’s radical potential, I can only say that I am in favor of Fair Trade in the same way that I am in favor of samesex marriage. Whereas same-sex marriage allows increased legal benefits, protections, and responsibilities to those who participate, certified Fair Trade provides increased access to global markets, some financial protection, and responsibilities to a cooperative or group of farmers. Yet it must be noted that both same-sex marriage and certified Fair Trade provide benefits only to those who fit a limited profile. To participate in same-sex marriage in the United States, one must have a recognized citizenship and a legally recognized gender, only one adult partner who consents to marry you, money for a marriage license, and access to a state government that permits same-sex marriage. Fair Trade is similarly limited to those who are privileged. To participate in Fair Trade, one must have certification of Fair Trade practices, ownership of or access to land to grow crops, membership in a cooperative, and access to income or assets. Fair Trade provides major social and economic benefits to farmers and producers who participate, yet Fair Trade does not intervene in the lives of the very poorest farmers in most cases (Jaffee 2007). Certainly there are social, legal, emotional, and economic benefits of both Fair Trade and gay marriage to those who participate. However, both are solutions that work within existing legal and economic structures, systems designed to privilege heterosexuality, whiteness, existing wealth, able-bodiedness, and the nation-state. It is undeniable that some people – some bodies – will never be qualified to participate in either project, whereas others will not want to. As Lyn Ossome argues in Chapter 7 of this volume, a teleological view of economic justice can blind observers to those who cannot ‘move forward’ in the prescribed way. Ossome additionally questions whether justice can possibly be held within the embrace of capitalism. I want to focus primarily on Ossome’s critique of attempting to locate justice within capitalism, for this leaves room to consider how justice might be struggled for across, through, and around capitalism by those who deliberately engage in queer economies – that is, a variety of capitalist, alternative capitalist, and noncapitalist activities motivated by queer desires – in order to survive and thrive. Therefore, I wish to stipulate that while a framework of economic bodies could chart progressive and liberal economies not usually visible within conventional economic discourse, more is needed to develop this concept in order to locate and describe radical, transformative, queer economies of desire. The next section elaborates on what I mean by queer economic bodies, and articulates ways these economies make queer survival possible. Queer desires multiply economic possibilities As I gather evidence of multiple, interrelated, queer economies through a process of witnessing, storytelling, and internet ‘eavesdropping’ (Facebook), it is obvious that queer people – using Cohen’s radical political potential to include a wide range of individuals – co-create communities and economies blending capitalist, alternative capitalist, and noncapitalist activities into economic bodies. These economic bodies become queer economies if the blended activities are used to pursue queer desires shaped by (as Halberstam describes ‘queer’ to indicate) nonnormative logics of community, sexual identity, embodiment, and activity – including economic processes – in space and time. One example of this blending for queer desires is the Trans\*ition Fund Collective (T\*FC), a Tumblr begun in January, 2012 to ‘highlight the projects of trans\* individuals fundraising for their transition while sharing some awesome trans\*-friendly products and resources. Submissions are always welcome!’ (T\*FC; see website in notes at the end of the chapter). More than 15 individuals posted fundraising efforts and personal stories on T\*FC during the first month, primarily for surgery and follow-up care for themselves or a loved one. Some fundraisers sell pre-made items such as video games, sex toys, or books, while others offer their skills in trade or to personalize a special gift. Most create art such as t-shirts, screen prints, jewelry, and paintings to fund medical costs. The remaining Tumblr posts include resources, information about moderators Ariel and Codi, binder giveaways, and general encouragement of trans\* individuals. I classify the Trans\*ition Fund Collective as a queer economy because it is prompted by the nonnormative desire to medically change one’s body to better match one’s self-identified gender, and it blends capitalist (the medical-industrial complex), alternative capitalist (fundraising via Tumblr), and noncapitalist (bartering, trading, and gifting) economic activities. The T\*FC additionally manifests queer desires by not focusing solely on profit; its features include strengthening ties between individuals and their supporters via Tumblr. Its use of multiple economic processes (art, bartering, trade, gifting, collaborating, fundraising) alongside an engagement in the medical-industrial complex is an unconventional kind of economic arrangement, an economic body neither fully inside nor wholly outside a conventional profitmaking capitalism. Additionally, its relationship-building (supporting, connecting, communicating, promoting) across in-person and internet interactions provides a model of community engagement and transformation for other trans\* people. Porously queer economies One reason for the intermingling of various economic activities in a porous queer economy may be that the politically queer humans laboring in queer economies are themselves diverse and experience intersecting forms of systemic oppression that must be met with multiple forms of resistance. Engaging in different forms of economic activity – in different kinds of enterprise – is one strategy for resistance and survival. So, too, is engaging in a variety of relationships and forms of community. An example of a queer economy pursuing ‘nonnormative logics and community’ is a Tumblr called To the Other Side of Dreaming (TTOSOD; see website in notes at the end of the chapter). TTOSOD documents the journey of disability justice/transformative justice activists Mia Mingus and Stacey ‘Cripchick’ Milbern to move together from the US south to the Bay Area of California, despite immense economic and social limitations to mobility faced by people with disabilities. In pursuing this endeavor, they said to their communities in the blogosphere: [We] have decided to live together and create/cultivate interdependent queer disabled korean diasporic radical women of color home together. We are embarking on a journey together to put pieces of disability justice into practice, love each other and live on the other side of dreaming. A huge part of this is our need, as crips, as queers, and women of color, as korean (and all) diasporic people; we need each other and we need you. (TTOSOD) Mingus and Milbern ask for assistance finding affordable, accessible housing and creating a community care collective in Berkeley, California, to assist with Milbern’s needs until the state of CA approves her application and provides home assistive care. They transgress complicated state regulations and social norms that make it difficult for persons with disabilities to move. They explicitly name love and healing a variety of inter-related traumas as part of their relationship-building. The response towards To the Other Side of Dreaming in the first two weeks was remarkable: members of their online and in-person community offered advice and connections to affordable housing and began creating a schedule for a careshift collective. Some online community members sold books, while another friend organized an Etsy shop to raise money for their move and transition. The kinds of support To the Other Side of Dreaming required to prepare to move across the United States differs from the kinds of day-to-day support needed after moving and settling in. Questions of quantity of assistance as well as quality of relationships are critical. Enough people have to be involved to avoid burnout – and those who commit to assisting need to be honest about what they can contribute and for how long. Some ‘allies’ stuck around to provide access for less than six months, perhaps not knowing or caring how their absence can shift a situation of thriving to one of surviving. TTOSOD, as queer economy, relies particularly on creativity, flexibility, and interdependence, as well as access to money, able-bodied persons with access, and state services. In Chapter 7 of this volume, Lyn Ossome challenges the teleological view of most discussions of economic justice, and her arguments apply here: that TTOSOD remains a functioning queer economy, but one that defies the linear narrative of progress and invites the question whether rubbing queer economies against other queer economies is always or necessarily pleasurable, particularly when some economies operate from greater privileges. Queer economies, queer relationships Like other economic bodies, queer economies engage in relationship-making and a variety of economic processes for survival of nonnormative human bodies. Some of these processes may look like a poor imitation of capitalisms – for example, so-called ‘economies of affection’ with activities such as gifting, trading, bartering, trashpicking, and repurposing. However, I would argue they no more mock capitalisms than a dildo mocks a penis. Each of these noncapitalist exchanges offers relational pleasures and responsibilities. Profit-making is not the sole point of these economic activities. Relationships and tool-usage matter as much as form and purpose. Gibson-Graham (1999) and Escobar (1995) reveal that a Western ideological framework invisibilizes some economic activities, while denigrating and calling for the destruction of others. Success and survival within this context become linked to one’s ability to perform as an ideal ‘rational’ economic actor for capitalism. As Escobar has argued, ‘through economic sciences (classical political economy) and broader philosophical conceptions (derived from the Enlightenment, utilitarianism, empiricism), this system produced a certain subjectivity, namely, that embodied in the modern producing subject’ (2005: 142). Cultivating a sense of the profit motive was seen as a crucial component of becoming an ideal producer for the global market, while gift-giving, charity, bartering, and other forms of noncapitalist exchange were ridiculed as being non-rational and non-productive (Escobar 1995; Harvey 2005; Scott 1995). My fifth example of a queer economy embraces many ‘nonrational’ economic activities. Mobile Homecoming (MBHC) is designed by Dr. Alexis Pauline Gumbs, black queer feminist poet and revolutionary, and her partner, Julia Wallace, revolutionary black queer filmmaker, to record the stories of queer black elders in the US. They reached out to online and in-person communities to raise funds for a mobile home to travel to the homes of queer black elders to conduct interviews. Gumbs and Wallace build relationships and raise money through holding freedom schools, selling poetry and books, creating films and teaching resources available online for free and for sale, sharing meals, asking for donations of money, love, and support, and connecting with other queer radicals in North Carolina, USA, and around the globe. According to Gumbs and Wallace’s MBHC (see website in notes at the end of the chapter), the point of their work is to heal, love, and honor black queers, and to support other revolutionary relationships. MBHC is explicitly not a nonprofit. They write: We understand that the modes of survival in our black queer communities which include: – social support organizing – artistic creativity – spiritual transformation – revolutionary interpersonal relationships are our key resources as we transform the meaning of life. (MBHC website) MBHC is queer economy for its intentional mixing of monetary exchange, creative resourcefulness, and deliberate community-building meant to generate love and structural healing. Celebrating the full range of black queerness fundamentally shapes MBHC and affiliated projects. ‘Community’ is defined not by geographic boundaries, nor by boundaries around race or gender, but by reaching out to like-minded social revolutionaries working for justice. There are thousands of people who belong to Gumbs and Wallace’s community – their project of celebrating black queer love and honoring queer intergenerational connection through listening projects and recording history clearly speaks to many. This is one example of how queer economies function – through connections, networks of respect and mutuality, and by speaking truth to power. Because ‘the economy’ is never enough: desiring (more) queer economic bodies In this chapter, I analyse five examples of queer economies to begin to think through what makes queer economies queer, and what makes queer economies valuable. In considering what makes queer economies queer, first, they are a type of economic body animated by queer desires. Economic bodies are inherently relational. Second, queer economies differ conceptually from ‘the economy’, because they are not a singular, unified entity like ‘Capitalism’ – they are multiple and allow us to ‘have some more’. Third, queer economies differ from Gibson-Graham’s framing of multiple economies (as capitalisms, alternative capitalisms, or noncapitalisms) because queer economies – like many economic bodies – weave together two or more kinds of economic activities in pursuit of queer desires. Finally, queer economies function differently from other economic bodies because they focus on nonnormative arrangements of community and relationship-building while pursuing queer desires. The value of queer economies comes from this bundle of characteristics. The relationship-making aspects of queer economies are as important as their plurality and their blending of economic activities. Relationship-making – between people and between economies – enables queer economies to sidestep larger structural forces that disenfranchise queer people and thwart queer desires. Specifically, TTOSOD and MBHC name desires such as love and healing personal and structural wounds as key goals motivating the activities of their economic bodies. Attempting to diffuse or heal structural harms is also clear in T\*FC’s use of Tumblr to provide emotional support for trans\* youth who experience social pressure to pretend to be the sex/gender assigned to them at birth. Scavengers like my family and trashpickers in Los Angeles have a nonnormative relationship with trash, which pushes back against structural norms that insist ‘nice people’ spend money to pursue their desires or that those who don’t have money don’t deserve to thrive. One reason queer economies might be difficult to identify and describe is that many are utilizing forms of alternative and noncapitalist exchange that are typically categorized as non-economic. Queer economies work differently from how we have been taught that capitalisms function, even as queer economies operate through, within, and outside them. Therefore, queer economies have the potential to create justice through desires for nonnormative logics of community, sexual identity, embodiment, and activity – including economic processes – in space and time.12 This requires flexibility and creativity, as well as the pleasurable and often-difficult work of building relationships and being accountable for our actions. Re-theorizing economies as bodies is not merely an intellectual exercise – I mean to multiply our options for engaging in economic activities. Naming and describing queer economies makes clear the unconscious links between economies-as-bodies and the embodied persons laboring within them in service of queer desires. So I ask: what queer desires move your economic bodies? What relationships must you engage in to manifest your desires? With whom will your economic bodies collaborate, flirt, merge, avoid, fight, make up, bargain, or trade? What – or who – will your queer economies long for? Applying our ideas about human bodies leads to greater recognition of – and perhaps participation in – economies already animated by queer desires and justice. What will your queer economies do? Because ‘the economy’ simply isn’t enough to hold all your queer possibilities.

#### The aff offers liberal reformation of the *debate community* to naturalize an educational paradigm that perpetuates a social and economic order built on protocols of domination. It is insufficient now to ask “what do we learn from the aff’s education”; now we must ask “what kind of life do we want [this] education for”

Bourassa 19 **(**Gregory Bourassa, Assistant Professor of Social Foundations at the University of Northern Iowa, “Educational Biopolitics, Innovation, and Social Reproduction,” 2019, Springer Nature Singapore, Encyclopedia of Educational Innovation)

Reproduction theorists seek to understand schools as institutions that are implicated in the reproduction of ideologies, social relations, and divisions of labor necessary to sustain the existing social world. One of the key claims, then, is that schools are not neutral depoliticized sites, let alone great equalizers. Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis (2011) make clear that schooling “has never been a potent force for economic equality” (p. 8). Rather it has reproduced inequalities while maintaining the pretense of equal opportunity. In investigating the school’s “role in hiding or justifying the exploitative nature of the U.S. economy,” their analysis rejects any nostalgic rhetoric about the democratic origins of public schooling and challenges liberal educational theory’s uncritical acceptance of the role of schools in transitioning students into a particular social order (p. 14). While reproduction theorists have paid close attention to how schools classify and organize students along the lines of race, class, and gender, Bowles and Gintis suggest that the origins of these types of inequalities “lies outside of education, in a system of economic power and privilege in which racial distinctions play an important role” (p. 35). This position challenges deficit theories that blame educational failure on teachers, students, and the communities to which they belong. On the contrary, inequality is understood to be endemic to capitalism, and therefore failure is not an accidental occurrence but a necessary feature of capitalist schooling. This understanding led Bowles and Gintis to explore the limits of liberal educational theory and “Band Aid” liberal reform efforts that failed to trouble the logics of capitalism or acknowledge how those logics were infused in the structure, organization, and rationale of schooling. Without coming to terms with this relation, liberal reform efforts “preserve the role of schooling in the perpetuation of economic order” (p. 152). The same conclusion must be drawn about educational innovation. If there were a central concept that Bowles and Gintis contributed to the larger field of social reproduction theory, it would be the correspondence principle. Theorizing the relation between schools and capitalism, Bowles and Gintis (2011) suggested that the “structure of social relations in education not only inures the student to the discipline of the work place, but develops the types of personal demeanor, modes of self-presentation, self-image, and social class identifications which are crucial ingredients of job adequacy” (p. 131). The correspondence principle helped to explain how school practices replicate hierarchal divisions of labor, not just in the technical sense of granting students different degrees of access within the occupational structure but also socially. For Bowles and Gintis, this meant that schools must be understood as sites for the management and organization of social, political, educational, and economic life. Put in terms that resonate with the literature in educational biopolitics, the correspondence principle not only highlights how schools reinforce relations of domination, but it offers some insight into how differentiated forms of educational life are cultivated, confined, valued, and devalued. Nonetheless, reproduction theorists, and particularly Bowles and Gintis, have been criticized for being too deterministic. The concern was that the correspondence principle neglected the ways in which students resist the social relations of capital as opposed to passively internalizing them. While the correspondence theory has its limits, Bowles and Gintis did not succumb to a deterministic account. While pointing to how the school system in the USA has served the interests of capital, they suggest that this is not a totalizing process, for schooling “also produces misfits and rebels” and has “given birth to a powerful radical movement and critique of capitalist society” (p. 12). While the focus of reproduction theory is how schools perpetuate the inequalities of the larger social order, Bowles and Gintis believed that education – following a larger transformation of the social order – could “unleash a people’s creative powers without recreating the oppressive poles of domination and subordinacy, self-esteem and self-hatred, affluence and deprivation” (p. 17). It is along these lines where there is some overlap with affirmative theories of educational biopolitics that seek to move beyond the “commodification, normalization, or abandonment of educational life” (Lewis 2006, p. 176). Educational Biopolitics While educational biopolitics builds on and extends the project of reproduction theorists, the precise relation between these traditions has been insufficiently explored (Bourassa 2017). This could be explained in part because the orientations and tendencies that were assumed and employed by reproduction theorists now maintain a strange status. In one sense, they are thought to be antiquated due to the perception that they neglect possibilities of agency and resistance and, at the same time, the basic insights they advance have undoubtedly, if only in implied form, seeped into other domains of critical educational studies, including educational biopolitics. However, a more obvious explanation for why these traditions are not more explicitly intertwined is that educational biopolitics owes much of its design to contemporary political theorists such as Giorgio Agamben, Roberto Esposito, Michel Foucault, and Antonio Negri. While this has brought exciting theoretical tools to educational theory, it has also facilitated some problems, which I will briefly mention below. Studies in biopolitics take many divergent directions, and thus while there are variant uses of the term, most explore the intersections of life, politics, subjectivity, and power. This could involve attempts to understand the unequal distribution of life and death possibilities along lines of race, class, ability, gender, and sexuality and how such a distribution arranges and affects the terms of living. Or, it could involve explorations of collective forms of life that engender a new order where the condition of life for some is not predicated on conditions of death for others. Drawing off these different inflections, educational biopolitics has focused on how educational life is both vulnerable to the operations of biopower (a power over life) and a site of generative possibilities through which subjectivity breaks with the nexus of power relations, producing new possibilities for knowledge production and politics (Lewis 2006). Thus one of the most important contributions of educational biopolitics has been an exploration of how schools facilitate and manage forms of educational life and educational death (Bourassa 2017; Lewis 2006). This involves thinking about the political economy of life in schools and the ways in which some forms of life, modes of being, and ways of knowing are exalted while others are eradicated, contained, or rendered disposable. Clayton Pierce’s (2013) Education in the Age of Biocapitalism is a central text in this literature, and it starts with an earnest exploration to a familiar question: “What kind of life do we want education to be for?” (p. 38). Pierce demonstrates that the concept of educational life is deeply wedded to the imperatives of neoliberalism, so much so that students are regarded as “forms of biocapital to be managed, regulated, and optimized for greater value.” (p. 68). In an age of biocapitalism, where vast forms of life are increasingly put to use, schools are sites of extraction that optimize and manage human capital, treating educational life as a mineable resource. There are numerous problems with this arrangement. Forms of knowledge and ways of being that capitalism considers either superfluous or threatening are discarded and rendered disposable (Bourassa 2017; Lewis 2006; Pierce 2013). At stake is not simply a profoundly unequal economy of educational life that provides forms of protection for some and renders our most vulnerable even more insecure. In addition, the very types of life and subjective modalities that are cultivated should be regarded as a problem. In this way, as I suggest below, there is reason to be “against both the making and taking of educational life” (Bourassa 2017, p. 342). While Pierce has largely focused on the operations of biopower – as a power over life – and how educational life is subject to the neoliberal economic mandates that result in particular investments and disinvestments in educational subjects, Tyson Lewis (2006) demonstrates how disciplinary practices in schools attempt to reduce students (predominantly students of color) to bare life, “a life devoid of pedagogical supplement” in which “the student is reduced to nothing more than a body that must be policed” (p. 169). Lewis’ analysis demonstrates how schools, particularly in the USA, are spaces of biopower that employ the sovereign function of deciding which life is worthy of living and which life is not. However, Lewis also theorizes an affirmative biopolitics of education that forefronts the possibilities for new collective subjects that escape the control of power and overcome the death logics of the camp. This shift to an affirmative educational biopolitics is paramount, and, in ways that reflect the larger field of biopolitical studies, it has involved different approaches, namely, attempts to register the ways in which an already existing collective subject resists biopower or, alternatively, attempts to theorize new figures of subjectivity – a coming subject that is, for the most part, not yet. What is required now is more attention to the assumptions that underpin these approaches. This entails rethinking and exploring conceptions of corporeality and materialism with a keen sense of how some subjects, knowledge, and forms of politics are rendered intelligible, while others remain unintelligible. If the educational biopolitics literature cited above owes a large debt to Agamben, Esposito, Foucault, and Negri, it should also be noted that it has inherited their inattention to particular logics like ableism, for instance, resulting in profound absences and insensitivities to the ways in which schools produce disability and ableism. This is important not simply as a matter of indexing the political economy of life in schools but more fundamentally for appreciating how “crip/queer” bodies frustrate the conception of the normate subject and offer new forms of resistance to biopower, creating alternative modes of interaction that violate neoliberalism’s demands of productivity (Mitchell 2015). Methodologically, if an affirmative educational biopolitics is to reformulate agency, revolutionary subjectivity, and the power of life itself, then it must attend more closely to embodiment and the material efficacy of bodies, that is, to the role of corporeality in politics. Demystifying Educational Innovation: An Affirmative Biopolitics Beyond the Making and Taking of Educational Life Despite proclaimed concerns about the persistence of inequalities, the practices and technologies implemented under the guise of educational innovation are entangled with commitments to preserving a capitalist future. They preserve a capitalist future while also utilizing a social justice narrative of inclusion that promises to make, and more equitably distribute, educational life. For many, the making of educational life may appear as the antidote to the taking of educational life that is evident in disciplinary practices that punish and abandon marginalized youth, rendering them disposable. Studies in educational biopolitics, however, recognize the making of life as one of the primary functions of biopower (Bourassa 2017). It is the first part of a complex equation: to make live and to let die. As mentioned earlier, educational innovation must be read through the lens of biopower as a project to maximize human capital and manage educational, social, and economic life. Both reproduction theory and educational biopolitics critically orient scholars in relation to educational innovation and attune them to the ways in which the making of educational life is always accompanied by “the process of letting die – a form of disinvestment in the educational life of a large number of students” (Bourassa 2017, p. 337). This is the one and only true promissory logic of capitalist schooling. An affirmative educational biopolitics does not task itself with making life but rather with engendering or conserving the conditions under which educational life can cultivate new figures of subjectivity and alternative educational logics, knowledge, politics, and collective ways of being. An affirmative educational biopolitics pushes us to expand the horizon of possibilities and break with the logics of biopower that parse proper and improper subjects, knowledge, ways of being, and ways of knowing. It rejects the instrumental and teleological conceptions of education for human capital and calls for new imaginaries and politics that nourish arrangements of being that are for, and in the service of, life itself. At a moment when educational innovation looms large, reproduction theories and studies in educational biopolitics offer indispensable tools. Pierce’s (2013) question, “What kind of life do we want education to be for?” should be at the center of any conversation related to educational innovation, and it should be accompanied by a repudiation of responses that narrowly link education with economic viability and the development of human capital (p. 38). As a framework for inquiry, studies in educational biopolitics are crucial at this moment because they understand schools as sites that do more than transmit content and skills. They recognize that schools are contested sites of struggle over the production, reproduction, and management of life. If educational innovation is marshaled to preserve a capitalist future, educators and educational researchers must address the ways in which the violence and injuries of capitalism are differentially distributed across lines of race, class, gender, sexuality, and ability. This involves attending to the hidden and not-sohidden logics of white supremacy, heteropatriarchy, coloniality, ableism, and their intersecting coordinates. The task is not to simply challenge curricular and pedagogical enclosures but to understand how ontological and epistemological enclosures have always been at the heart of capitalist schooling. Because these enclosures increasingly happen under the guise of educational innovation, inclusion, or even social justice, educators must be knowledgeable in their local contexts in order to understand and refuse the specific logics, institutional technologies, and operations of biopower that inform the spaces they inhabit. It is only through such collective refusals – refusals nourished by an astute recognition of the complexities of our contemporary moment – that an affirmative educational biopolitics can emerge, disrupt the normative operations of schooling, usher forth new educational logics, and collectively invent what happens next.

#### Evaluate desire first – it subsumes what social and political arrangements we hope to achieve

Charusheela 15 (S. Charusheela, Associate Dean and Professor at the School of Interdisciplinary Arts and Sciences University of Washington Bothell, “Global Justice and Desire: Queering Economy,” GlassHouse Book, 2015)

My sense is that our work is commonly motivated by a desire for a more radically restructured world, one which would have economic equality and political enfranchisement imagined in much more radical ways than they currently are. The question, though, that remains to be posed for us, I believe, is how we will make the translations between the philosophical commentary on the field of politics and the reimagining of political life. This is surely the kind of question which will render productive and dynamic the opposition between formalism and historicism, between the ostensibly a priori and the a posteriori. One might reply that any notion of economic equality will rely on a more generalized understanding of equality, and that that is part of what is interrogated by this kind of work. Or one might reply that any notion of a future of radically transformed economic relations will rely on a notion of futurity, and futurity is part of what is being attended to here. But such responses go only part of the distance in answering the question that is posed. For what happens to the notion of equality when it becomes economic equality? And what happens to the notion of the future when it becomes an economic future? We ought not simply to ‘plug in’ the economic as the particular field whose conditions of possibility can be thought out on an a priori level. It may also be that the very sphere of the economic needs to be rethought genealogically. Its separation from the cultural, for instance, by structuralist legacies within anthropology might need to be rethought against those who claim that the very separation of those spheres is a consequence of capital itself. Judith Butler (2000: 277–8) Where does desire enter the economic? A common way of putting it is that our ability to obtain the goods and services we desire – whether things we need or things we want – is constrained by our economic circumstances. Conceptualizing the link between desire and economy as that of constraint acts as a ‘common sense’ starting point for much theorizing within and without the discipline of economics. While it finds its most obvious expression in the neoclassical economist’s conception of the budget constraint, the concept of economy as constraint to desire is not limited to the narrowly utilitarian neoclassical tradition – Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach and radical critiques of inequality that highlight conspicuous consumption by some and inability to consume by others also understand the economic in terms of constraint on our ability to attain desired outcomes. Framing the link between desire and economy through the lens of constraint leads us to a project and politics of relaxing the material constraints, whether expressed as a modernist project of growth and development or a social democratic project of wealth and income redistribution along with social safety nets. But we can go much further than the redistributive politics of liberal social democracy when we move past understanding economy as constraint to desire, and instead approach economy as a set of social relations within which social subjects, and thus desire itself, get constituted: constraint on desire, nature/object/ structure of desire, and desiring social subject all emerge out of the same set of processes, and co-constitute each other. Radically oriented scholarship and politics seeks to address this relation between desire and economy as an urgent one for a transformative politics beyond redistributive social democracy. Such scholarship both questions the origins and operation of desire (heteronormed desires, desires for objects of consumption, for equality under capitalism and recognition under modernity) and seeks out other desires (desires for just societies, for non-alienated forms of community, for other ways of engaging the world, for alternate futures). As a location from which both the potentials for containment and the possibilities for transformative agency can emerge, radical social theorists and political activists have sought to both analyse and break from the ways social structures and institutions, including those gathered under the sign of the ‘economic’, constitute desiring subjects and the objects of their desire. Radical theorists and activists are not alone in seeking to account for and theorize desire. In neoclassical analyses of preferences and utility functions, bourgeois economics has marked desire as the core of its conception of individual decisionmaking and choice. Here, choice anchors neoclassical economics’ conception of the social good, taking the place of ethical valuation. Even as it places desire at the ethical center of analysis through its commitment to the concept of individual choice, this approach tames desire, providing us with a lukewarm and vapid conception of what it means to hunger, to really want something. All that remains is a dry formulation of passionless orderings and rankings for various ‘options’ – usually, but not always, limited to options between various commodity bundles. All else is a transaction at arm’s length experienced not as a passionate connection (or equally passionate disavowal) but as a movement between these varied choice sets. At best, one may add in other items such as needs for living wages through tweaks of the sets of options we may choose among and/or the ranking we provide them. Aspects of desires which cannot be adequately accommodated through such tweaking, such as desires for social justice or environmental sustainability, can enter as the need to address externalities, as infrastructural issues of law and health care and sewage due to ‘market failure’ – that is, as things that happen in some space outside the arm’s length of exchange because they reflect desires whose fulfillment is not captured through individual transactions even if the desires themselves can be tweaked into the preference orderings. Even altruism, which occupies much attention in current efforts to model the bourgeois heteronorms of familial care, enters weakly as a tweak to preference orderings. Emotions such as grief, regret, or anger have little to no space in the analysis (regret or remorse are particularly difficult, since they entail disavowals of previously made choices – nobody looks back and laments past decisions in standard economics). Deep and powerful wells of ‘base’ desires such as Fanonian envy and fantasies of vengeance, of resentment at insult or murderous fury from collective memories of loss, do not have a place in the story. Desires for other ways of being in the world do not enter at all. Other than greed redefined as self-interest (and even that greed palely rendered as rationality with little resemblance to the lusts for wealth and power that shape and define much of the actual working of economy), and despite desirerendered-as-preference functioning as both analytic and ethical core for the concept of ‘choice’ in this approach, desire in bourgeois economics is a very weak and tame thing indeed. And, of course, this is not accidental. In its tame depiction of desire, bourgeois economics reflects the ideological self-imagination of bourgeois liberal modernity. If desire and passion enter the story in such vacuous ways, it is because bourgeois economics retains the evacuation of desire and passion resultant from the reason–emotion/rationality–passion divide instantiated by the subjective self-constitution of bourgeois liberal modernity. I will not repeat here the well-recounted histories of the origins of this episteme. As poststructuralist/ postcolonial theorists in multiple fields have shown, this Self is constructed through opposition to a raced, classed, sexed, gendered, colonial Other. It is, of course, quite easy to critique this formulation on purely realist grounds, and scholars within and beyond economics, liberal and radical, have provided substantial critiques. Economists allied under the umbrella rubric of heterodox economics, ranging across the political spectrum from conservative to liberal to radical, encompassing diverse schools of thought including Austrian, PostKeynesian, Institutionalist, Marxist, and feminist economics, have devoted themselves to the task of providing a correct/alternate analysis of economic decisionmaking more aligned with ‘reality’.2 But the problem we face is not merely that bourgeois economics gets it wrong. The problem with a modernist episteme such as this is that it is constitutive: what is left once we undertake such analysis is not merely description but prescription, a cause posing as an effect. When we re-open this analysis to bring back desire and emotion, unless we grasp the ways in which this episteme functions as generative of subjectivity, our conclusions rehearse the modernist project. We begin by looking for the ‘real’ – which often becomes an accounting of the ‘real’ ways in which specific social subjects depart from this imagined-ideal. Since the imagined-ideal reflects a specific selfconstitution, we would, not surprisingly, find that those who more closely align with the ideal seem to flourish better. From which follows the conclusion: if we can desire the right objects and attain the right and dutiful training into skill and citizenship, if we can just get the analysis right to identify where the blockage from the ideal vision lies for a specific group, we can then undertake appropriate policies that will lead us into class mobility, liberal democratic freedoms, development. Our radical projects devolve into ‘fixing’ efforts that instantiate the unfinished business of modernity, through, for example, gender training (to use Spivak’s (2000) evocative phrase), or via integrative efforts at education-into-capitalist-labor. A crucial effect of this episteme, which the realist response can only rehearse, is a limiting of our imagination of radical alternatives to a combination of redistribution and safety nets, with all other ‘change’ imagined through a combination of recognition by and education into liberal capitalist citizenship. Addressing the modernist evacuation of desires’ multiple valences and locations from our understanding of the economic thus requires an effort that moves beyond simple social-scientific realist behaviourism, an Other way of narrating the relation between the two (Kaul 2004). This book takes on that project, bringing queer theory, postcolonial theory, race/ethnic studies, and poststructuralist/ Althusserian Marxism to bear on a critical analysis of the relation between desire and economy. By centering justice rather than ‘reality’ as the term that organizes their conversation, the authors advance our understanding of the relationship between a politics of desire and a politics of economic transformation. Such a project is necessarily fraught, as no text travels in a vacuum. A queer theoretic text taking up economy enters an intellectual terrain marked by legacies of earlier fights within the field of left scholarship and politics: fights about the implications of poststructuralist frameworks and the ‘cultural turn’ for Marxist thought, arguments about how the new social movements and the new interdisciplinary knowledge projects they gave rise to reflected an identity politics at the cost of economic radicalism and class politics. Rather than fruitlessly seeking to ‘settle’ questions such as whether the gay, lesbian, bisexual, trans, queer (GLBTQ) movements address or ignore issues of class, and whether queer theoretic approaches take up or ignore questions of economy, the volume showcases multiple aspects of the limits and pitfalls, as well as the promise and potentialities, of GLBTQ communities and movements.

### 2

#### CP Text: Jach’a marka mink’ai echay qanqa di istadus unidus.

#### It solves

Belcourt 17 (Billy-Ray Belcourt is from Driftpile Cree First Nation. He is a PhD student in the Department of English and Film Studies at the University of Alberta. “The Optics of the Language: How Joi T. Arcand Looks with Words.” 8-29-17. <https://canadianart.ca/features/optics-language-joi-t-arcand-looks-words/> //shree)

What did Bushby see? In his formulation, “one” brings into focus a sinister optic, where “optic” is the lens or filter by which one looks and from this looking ropes what is seen into an encounter humming with all sorts of potential. Bushby’s is an optic that mediates the interpellative call “one” seeks to enact—it is a part of the grammar of settler horror. “One” is thus a modality by which we, the ante-Canada, those of us who bear that which is prior to and beneath Canada, are racialized and roped into a representational field where all things, like trailer hitches, can be put to violent use. We cannot survive in the visual register of “one.” Words are worldly; not just in the sense that they proliferate and float up into the sky and become cloud-like. Words world too. Words like “one” incubate death-worlds (see Achille Mbembe’s 2003 essay “Necropolitics”) inside which those of us who look like Kentner are made to inhabit modes of enfleshment that fix the stares of the grim reapers of the present. On the other hand, some of us recruit words in the name of something like freedom. We might call this duality the double-bind of enunciation. How do we refuse a savage call to being with a more spacious one? Joi T. Arcand is a photo-based artist and industrial sculptor from Muskeg Lake Cree Nation, and she knows that words, that letter forms, shapes and glyphs, “change the visual landscape,” that they are how we go about practicing new ways of looking. Words are emotional architectures, and Arcand calls hers “Future Earth.” In her 2015 book The Argonauts, Maggie Nelson tends to a debate about whether words do or do not potentiate. She takes up a claim of a partner’s that words do nothing but nominalize, and what is left unnamed is subject to a host of horrors. Nelson, however, holds out more hope for words; she contends that they are “good enough,” that how one speaks makes all of the difference and that words can, following Deleuze, incite “the outline of a becoming.” Bushby’s angered vocalization of a genre of non-being—where “one” is the refusal of a name and the humanity that comes with it—is evidence of the terrible mechanics of language. But, it is in opposition to this linguistic state of killability, this metaphysics and rhetoric of coloniality, that Arcand articulates a grammar of subjectivity vis-à-vis the time and space of a native future. Here on Future Earth is a series of photographs that Arcand produced in 2010. In a phone interview, Arcand explained to me that this is where her photo-based practice and her interest in textuality synched. Arcand wants us to think about these photographs as documents of “an alternative present,” of a future that is within arm’s reach. For this series, Arcand manipulated signs and replaced their slogans and names with Cree syllabics. By doing this, Arcand images something of a present beside itself and therefore loops us into a new mode of perception, one that enables us to attune to the rogue possibilities bubbling up in the thick ordinariness of everyday life. Arcand wanted to see things “where they weren’t.” Hers is not a utopian elsewhere we need to map out via an ethos of discovery. Rather, Arcand straddles the threshold of radical hope. She asks us to orient ourselves to the world as if we were out to document or to think back on a future past. That is, Arcand rendered these photographs with a pink hue and a thick, round border, tapping into what she calls “the signifiers of nostalgia.” Importantly, these signifiers are inextricably bound to the charisma of words, to the emotional life of the syllabics. The syllabics are what enunciate; they potentiate a performance of world-making that does not belong to the mise-en-scene of settlement. It is this mise-en-scene of settlement that Arcand conjures to then obliterate, which is to say that her photographs evince a prairie world that is crowded with meaning, meaning that belongs differently to the logic of terra nullius (that a place exists without history or politics prior to European settlement) and to myths of Indian savagery and degeneracy. It is against this system of signs that Arcand opens the prairies up to radical resignification. It is where we build a future atop the decayed remains of coloniality. Perhaps Here on Future Earth visually captures the tempos of “Indian time,” which is always a scene of errant temporality. Indian time is less about the absence of rhythm and more about an inability to fix or to analytically hold up the rhythmic as a mode of feral movement itself. Words like “one” are spun such that they stomp us into the rut of social death. But: Indian time evinces an otherwise kinetics. In Here on Future Earth, this kinetics is energized by the textual, by the stories that they tell, and their visual culture. The modified signs exploit our ability to look; that we see them and conceptualize them as out of place or untimely is how we transport ourselves to a different time, to a place governed by Indian time. The syllabics themselves map a visual field. This is what Arcand calls “the optics of the language.” It is around these words that sociality orbits. This thematic persists in Arcand’s latest project, a set of large neon signs that light up Cree words like keyam. For Arcand, all of her engagements with the Cree language are partly elegiac. She is mourning language loss, but puts this negative affect to rebellious use to signify a world-to-come. Like the syllabics in Here on Future Earth, the bright signs prop up affective structures for a time and place where our relations to Cree are not always-already bound up in performances of grief. In one sign, Arcand translates the English phrase “I don’t have the words” into Cree. “I don’t have the words” is a paradoxical speech act; it uses words to announce their absence. These signs are installed in gallery spaces where Arcand’s work is commissioned; one was recently installed at the second gesture of the Wood Land School at the SBC Gallery of Contemporary Art in Montreal, another outside the Walter Phillips Gallery in Banff. These signs interrupt the visual terrain of the gallery, as if welcoming onlookers to a new world, to a new geographic form. The signs something like kinship around a common wordlessness in the service of a new world-making praxis. These photographs and signs, then, are all relics of a future past. They emerge from something of an anthropological interest in a future-in-the-present, in the affects of Indian time. Arcand thus writes the world wrong so that she can write it anew.

### Case

#### Court circumvention---they ignore intent and plain meaning, reject literature bias towards optimism.

Crane ‘21 [Daniel A Crane. Frederick Paul Furth, Sr. Professor of Law, University of Michigan. I am very grateful for many helpful comments from Tom Arthur, Jonathan Baker, Steve Calkins, Dale Collins, Eleanor Fox, Rebecca Haw, Hiba Hafiz, Jack Kirkwood, Bob Lande, Christopher Leslie, Alan Meese, Steve Ross, Danny Sokol, and other participants at the University of Florida Summer Antitrust Workshop. "ANTITRUST ANTITEXTUALISM." https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4952&context=ndlr]

This view is so widely entrenched in the legal profession’s understanding of the antitrust laws—including, it must be admitted, this author’s—that it seems presumptuous to claim that the conventional wisdom is wrong, or at least significantly overstated. But it is. While the antitrust statutes may be lacking in some important particulars, they present a readily discernable meaning on many others. As Daniel Farber and Brett McDonnell have argued, “For the conscientious textualist, the statutory texts [of the antitrust laws] have considerably more specific meaning than the conventional wisdom would suggest.”5 And it is not simply the case that the meaning of the statutory texts could be rendered through ordinary methods of statutory interpretation but the courts have failed to see it. Rather, the courts frequently acknowledge that the statutory texts have a plain meaning, and then refuse to follow it.

But it gets worse. The courts have not merely abandoned statutory textualism or other modes of faithful interpretation out of a commitment to a dynamic common-law process. Rather, they have departed from text and original meaning in one consistent direction—toward reading down the antitrust statutes in favor of big business. As detailed in this Article, this unilateral process began almost immediately upon the promulgation of the Sherman Act and continues to this day. In brief: within their first decade of antitrust jurisprudence, the courts read an atextual rule of reason into section 1 of the Sherman Act to transform an absolute prohibition on agreements restraining trade into a flexible standard often invoked to bless large business combinations; after Congress passed two reform statutes in 1914, the courts incrementally read much of the textual distinctiveness out of the statutes to lessen their anticorporate bite; the courts have read the 1936 Robinson-Patman Act almost out of existence; and the Celler-Kefauver Amendments of 1950, faithfully followed in the years immediately after their promulgation, have been watered down to textually unrecognizable levels by judicial interpretation and agency practice. It is no exaggeration to say that not one of the principal substantive antitrust statutes has been consistently interpreted by the courts in a way faithful to its text or legislative intent, and that the arc of antitrust antitexualism has bent always in favor of capital.

#### Sustainable Development Goals are Sustainable Gentrification – the aff’s deployment of sustainability and environmental justice becomes a precursor for colonial dispossession that exacerbates structural inequities through racialized poverty and houselessness – turns case

Blok 20 (Anders Blok, Associate Professor at the Department of Sociology, Copenhagen University, “Urban Green Gentrification in An Unequal World of Climate Change,” 2020, Urban Studies Journal, Vol. 57(14))

Over the past few decades, notions of environmental, ecological or green gentrification in cities have entered the lexicon of critical urban scholars and activists alike, not least in North American and European settings (see Pearsall, 2018, for an overview). This happens amidst growing concerns that the current policy and planning emphasis on making cities more sustainable, or what was recently termed the new green planning orthodoxy (Connolly, 2019), serves in some cases to reinforce or even exacerbate sociomaterial inequalities in the city via forms of residential displacement. Such effects have been demonstrated for a range of cities and types of urban environmental change, including neighbourhood improvements in air quality (Sieg et al., 2004), public provision or renovation of parks and green space (Gould and Lewis, 2012) and protection from climate-induced flood risks via land elevation (Keenan et al., 2018). While this interdisciplinary strand of work has served to open up important questions and research agendas, much like gentrification in general (e.g. Ghertner, 2015; Krijnen, 2018), the descriptive and explanatory status of green gentrification theorising in particular arguably remains subject to many open-ended questions. Along with a recent call from some of the field’s foremost proponents (Anguelovski et al., 2018) to expand the socio-geographical parameters of green gentrification research, and to enrich the agenda via new theoretical approaches, I want in this commentary to suggest one particular avenue of problematisation that seems so far conspicuously lacking. Put briefly, this is the realisation that, in an unequal world of anthropogenic climate change, green gentrification must be grasped not only at local but also and simultaneously at transnational scales of socio-spatial restructuring, as these scales are being interlinked through the production and distribution of climate risks. This suggestion may be derived, I will argue, from aligning sociologist Ulrich Beck’s (1999, 2010) cosmopolitan theorising of the intensifying socio-material inequalities of climate change in ‘world risk society’ to the questions posed by green gentrification researchers. Such a move resonates, first, with recent strivings towards a post-colonial or indeed cosmopolitan view of gentrification as a global urban process constitutively mediated through diverse and ordinary urban settings also outside the EuroAmerican metropolitan zone (Lees et al., 2015; also Robinson, 2006). It also resonates, albeit more distantly so, with emerging conversations on planetary urbanisation and worldwide urbanisation patterns (e.g. Brenner and Schmid, 2015), including the way this has been taken up in the notion of ‘planetary rent gaps’ (Slater, 2017) constituted by the transnational power of speculative landed developer interests. Finally, Beck’s work articulates well with ongoing debates about deepening local–global environmental injustices (e.g. Faber, 2018), including in the realm of climate adaptation (Schlosberg, 2012), although offering a distinctly different sociological approach. Without denying the value that might spring from attempts to articulate all of the above approaches more firmly vis-a-vis green gentrification questions, my commentary is thus based on the assertion that Beck’s world risk society thinking offers a particularly crucial handle on the problems posed in this realm by climatic risks. This is the case, in a nutshell, since Beck (1999) allows us to grapple directly with what he calls the side-effect principle, whereby the uneven production and distribution of climate risks come to constitute a distinct new layer of transnational inequalities in their own right, tying together the fates of communities, regions and cities around the world (Beck and Blok, 2016). In doing so, I want to suggest, Beck’s risk-centric analytics has certain advantages over more capitalcentric approaches, like planetary urbanisation, when it comes to unravelling the many local ambivalences wedded with urban sustainability politics in the global North and global South alike, even as it helpfully insists that we keep their unequal trans-local risk interconnectedness in view. I myself arrive at this suggestion in a transversal way, so to speak, from having been engaged over the years in ‘methodologically cosmopolitan’ research on urban climate risk politics across East Asian, South Asian and European settings (Blok, 2012), yet without articulating this research in the language of green gentrification. Ethnographic research on urban climate interventions in Copenhagen, the capital of Denmark, and Surat in NorthWest India, however, has impressed upon me the importance of those questions of sociomaterial inequality and environmental (in)justice wedded with the green gentrification agenda. At the same time, as I will go on to argue, my research also lends itself well to attempts to tease apart some of green gentrification’s varied mechanisms, including not least, as these pertain specifically to climaterelated unequal developments. This in turn entails not least, a search for analytical frames capable of holding together urban settings that are otherwise worlds apart, with a view to their joint implication in the unequal global territories of climate risks. While the urban implications of Beck’s work are admittedly a matter for future debate (see Beck and Blok, 2016), his suggestion to study the intensifying globalised socio-material inequalities in a world of climate change is helpful here, I argue, in bringing green gentrification research beyond the neighbourhood or city level. In doing so, it brings attention to those risk interconnections that span across urban contexts in the North and South in highly unequal ways, while still insisting on those complicated on-the-ground contestations whereby multiple risks and vulnerabilities come to be mediated through any given urban site. In an unequal world of climate change, then, urban green gentrification must ultimately be positioned neither in ‘the local’ or ‘the global’, but rather in-between localised and globalised socio-material inequalities and as indeed connecting such different frames or scales of inequalities in new ways. Nordhavn, Copenhagen: The making of low-carbon privilege I originally started researching the large-scale, new-build Nordhavn project in Copenhagen due to it being steeped in sustainability planning rhetoric, and particularly from an interest in the comparative urban politics of climate risks across East Asia and Europe (see Blok, 2012, for details). Initiated in 2005 by the Danish government and the Municipality of Copenhagen, Nordhavn designs were timed to coincide with Copenhagen hosting the United Nations’ COP15 climate conference, so that the district would serve to strengthen the city’s claim as a green capital (Holden et al., 2019: 161). When I interviewed architectural and engineering consultants some years later, they were clear that COP15 had provided them a window of opportunity vis-a-vis the landowning public partnership, City and Port Development, to raise low-carbon ambitions well above the usual norm. Moreover, in municipal plans, Nordhavn commonly figures as the concrete embodiment of Copenhagen’s wider ambition to become so-called ‘carbon neutral’ by 2025, signalling the eco-political importance of the district. By contrast to such climatic articulations, judging from analyses of professional design documents and public media discussions (Blok and Meilvang, 2015), urban professionals have tended to gloss over the Nordhavn districts’ social composition rather briefly in the standard, thin ideological language of ‘diversity’ (see Connolly, 2019). Meanwhile, although intermittent years have seen plenty of environment related controversy over the site (Blok and Meilvang, 2015), very little activist contention or public discussion has pertained to socio-economic or distributional issues. This relative dearth of socio-ecological justice concerns is noteworthy given the commonsensical observation, notable to everyone in the city, that this district is becoming a lowcarbon enclave for the wealthy. Readily available sources document that home prices in Nordhavn are higher than for Copenhagen as a whole (Holden et al., 2019: 163), in a district provisioned with energy efficient housing and ample public transit options. As I will detail further on, rather than green gentrification per se, the Nordhavn case might then be better conceptualised as one of ‘low-carbon gentrification’ (Bouzarovski et al., 2018). The broad pattern of urban development expressed in Nordhavn, in which two of the three so-called sustainability pillars, those of environment and economy, attain more attention than the last pillar of social equity, clearly dovetails with recurring experiences across many cities in Europe and North America in recent decades. Indeed, scholars in urban economics, urban political ecology, critical planning studies and urban sociology deploy the notion of green or environmental gentrification exactly to point to such recurrent patterns of exclusionary development in contemporary sustainability-oriented urban transformations (Connolly, 2019). At the same time, however, the various mechanisms of green gentrification under different conditions arguably still await more careful delineation (Anguelovski et al., 2018). Working through Nordhavn is helpful, I will show, for disentangling some of these mechanisms, in ways that bring Beck’s global climate risk approach more centrally into the picture. Known in former times as ‘the city of welfare’ (Andersen and Winther, 2010), Nordhavn embodies the latest step in Copenhagen’s transformation not only towards a purportedly green capital, but also in the direction of infusing more neoliberal policy agendas into a traditionally equality- and social rights-oriented urban model characteristic of the Nordic countries (Anderberg and Clark, 2013; Holden et al., 2019). As a post-industrial waterfront site long since abandoned by harbour and production activities, Nordhavn thus inscribes itself into the city’s remarkable post-1990s recovery from economic downturn, emerging as a hub of new service and knowledge economies. Here, the project inherits its core institutional rules, conditions and strategies directly from the wider trajectory of stateled gentrification embodied in the neoliberally infused City and Port Development agency. This agency lies behind the so-called Ørestad district (Anderberg and Clark, 2013), as well as wider harbour re-developments, new metro construction and associated growth strategies enacted over the past decades – all under the rubric of ‘sustainability’ (Holden et al., 2019). One core institutional condition, indeed, is for the developers to generate maximum economic value from post-industrial harbour fronts like Nordhavn – and, quite predictably, one way of doing this has been to build high-end residential and commercial areas catering to the tastes of the upper middle classes, who are good taxpayers for the municipality and viable high-end consumers for local markets. In other words, to make sense of these new-build developments, including their sustainability aspects, we need to embed the Nordhavn district into a wider view of recent Copenhagen history that, as many have shown, has already seen its fair share of ‘old-fashioned’ gentrification. In the language of Hans Thor Andersen and Lars Winther (2010: 698), for instance, the combined and active effects of post-1990s urban policies in this city have been to gradually displace ‘low-income groups, immigrants, students, singles and others with below-average incomes’ out of the city. This observation is quite close to the classical definition of gentrification proposed by Ruth Glass in the 1960s, although expressed in contextually specific terms of class privilege and its assertion in new sustainability-oriented policies (see Lees et al., 2015). The core question for green gentrification scholarship, however, is how to relate this general notion of and tendency to gentrification, including its well-known analytical difficulties (e.g. Ghertner, 2015), with the various urban greening and sustainability initiatives that have become planning orthodoxy since the 1990s. This is no trivial task, in part because urban sustainability itself comes in several versions, including notably a literally ‘green’ focus on the city’s verdant affordances and a ‘grey’ focus on technical issues of carbon reduction (Wachsmuth and Angelo, 2018). In addition, while sustainable infrastructure and amenity provision may sometimes serve as a catalyst for gentrification, at other times a new gentrifying class may deploy its political advantage to demand environmental improvements (Pearsall, 2018). Arguably, we see a bit of both in Nordhavn, although in variegated ways that call for some analytical disentangling, particularly around the role played here by the risks of climate change. Importantly, the classic focus of green gentrification studies remains what Jennifer Wolch and colleagues (2014) call the ‘green space paradox’, signalling a much firmer focus on ‘green’ relative to ‘grey’ and climate-related forms of unequal development. The term expresses the idea that as green-space initiatives are put in place for historically deprived neighbourhoods, this may inadvertently serve to push out those lower-income groups for whose purported benefit the initiative was taken. In the analytical terms often used, what is happening here is that coalitions of municipalities, private investors and privileged upper middleclass residents benefit from creating and exploiting a ‘green’ rent gap (Anguelovski et al., 2018), manifested in the rise of property values resulting from better recreational opportunities, cleaner air and other greenspace affordances. Many studies from cities in the United States, in particular, show these dynamics at work, as well as documenting attendant environmental justice struggles driven by working-class and ethnic minority groups (see e.g. Gould and Lewis, 2012). However, it should be clear from my remarks so far that the Nordhavn case is hardly one of such a literal green-space paradox or attendant struggles. For one thing, as a post-industrial brownfield development project with little prior residential use and no groups directly threatened by dispossession, the case is a version of new-build gentrification (Lees et al., 2015: 14). Moreover, in the Copenhagen setting where public greenspace provision is relatively ample in many parts of the city, the new Nordhavn area is unlikely to stand out positively on this account. Instead, as noted, the contours of the areas’ privilege are better captured through the lens of ‘low-carbon gentrification’ (Bouzarovski et al., 2018), in the sense that wealthier groups here accrue a disproportionate share of new low-carbon infrastructures of energy-efficient housing, renewable energy provisioning and car-free transport via high-end metro and bicycle options. In other words, Nordhavn shapes up as an enclave for wealthier urbanites able to enjoy what counts locally as high-status lifestyles by default. While housing market discourses tend to highlight waterfront proximity as the area’s main attraction, this high level of service provisioning is driven mostly by sustainable development prerogatives of the local state, acting to channel new forms of low-carbon privilege. Indeed, in historical perspective, Nordhavn stands here as the latest expression of what is arguably a particularity of Copenhagen’s wider search for new eco-branding opportunities for the city (Anderberg and Clark, 2013: 602ff). With the rise of sustainability politics in the city in the early 1990s, driven by concerns to showcase Danish technology and eco-management tools, urban policies of housing stock renewal and expansion since then have almost all entailed an embedded focus on cleaner and more energy-efficient interventions. In this process, environmental performance criteria have been embedded into sustainability metrics serving as an inherent element of more general development tendencies. Put starkly, most gentrification in Copenhagen since 1990 has thus been environment and low-carbon gentrification, as these concerns have come to define the local version of competitive urbanism. This confluence in turn also helps to explain why, as Copenhagen has grown richer (Andersen and Winther, 2010), it has also grown ‘greener’ in the political sense, as manifested in the success of green-red political parties over the past decade. As elsewhere (e.g. Beck and Blok, 2016; Laidley, 2013), climatic concern has tended to be strong amongst exactly those cultural middle-class groups working in consultancy, design or public administration that have grown larger in relative size in Copenhagen, amidst gentrifying pressures. Alongside expressing low-carbon rather than green gentrification pressures as such, climatic concern also channels new privileges in Nordhavn in a different way, which I will call climate risk gentrification. In short, this is the tendency for investments in urban climate adaptation capacities to disproportionately favour wealthier groups in the city, to the detriment of those poorer, more vulnerable groups most immediately at risk (Anguelovski et al., 2016). Here, the Nordhavn district shares with many similar high-end, property speculation-oriented waterfront projects in places like Hamburg and Rotterdam the feature of being itself vulnerable to sea level risedriven risks of future storm surges and flooding. In other words, even as the area morphs into a wealthy low-carbon enclave, people moving here will be the worst hit should a storm surge hit Copenhagen. As studies from Miami in the US highlight (Keenen et al., 2018), property prices and socio-demographic area profiles nowadays tend to be directly linked to how far land is elevated above sea or river levels and hence is protected against flooding (see also Beck and Blok, 2016). However, residentially attractive waterfront sites like Nordhavn seem to constitute an ambiguous counter-tendency. In Nordhavn, by implication, the mechanism of climate risk gentrification at work is rather that of the areas’ low-carbon gentrification exerting pressure on subsequent adaptation policies and priorities. This is one plausible way of reading the recent announcement of harbour front expansion plans which, as part of its justification for further urban development, contains the promise of a movable flood barrier across to Nordhavn. While this barrier will benefit other parts of the city as well, a certain infrastructural path-dependency seems at work in which developments like Nordhavn necessitate further costly, structural flood protections – thereby occupying, in the foreseeable future, a significant share of the city’s adaptation budget. This is an example of ‘demand-led’ gentrification, set in train in Copenhagen by a more general process of the accumulation of privilege made possible, ultimately, in the context of the city’s entrepreneurial response to the new risks and opportunities of climate change (Blok, 2012). Multiplying the scales of green gentrification processes To briefly summarise, my argument so far is that Copenhagen’s resurgence since the 1990s exemplifies a marked example of environmental gentrification tendencies, in the general sense of sustainability-oriented urban strategies both acting as a catalyst for, and themselves resulting from, rent hikes and associated pressures on lowerincome groups. The high-profile Nordhavn development project, I argue, is best thought of as a subset of this wider process, marked by the creation of a wealthy enclave of lowcarbon privilege that helps set in motion further climate adaptation investments with unequal benefits. At this point, however, I want to highlight what has remained implicit in my discussion so far, and which often goes unstated in literature on green or environmental gentrification (e.g. Connolly, 2019; Gould and Lewis, 2012). This is the point that, while environmental and climatic challenges are global in scope, the frame of reference for claims about the inequalities and injustices driven by or resulting from orthodox urban greening agendas has so far been entirely local, that of the city itself. In other words, the scale or yardstick for metering out green gentrification processes refers here to processes of local sociodemographic changes in distributions and privileges, environmental and otherwise. Left aside are all the other frames of sociomaterial inequality that are, however, also relevant, and arguably increasingly so, for understanding processes of urban change vis-a-vis wider climate and sustainability challenges in an encompassing view (Beck, 2010). As I noted in the introduction, gentrification theories in general have long since started grappling with such questions through the notion of gentrification as a global urban process, mediated not least through the policy-scapes of neoliberalism and associated transnational circulations of speculative capital, deregulation techniques and urban consultants (e.g. Harris, 2008; Slater, 2017). However, important as these capital-centric analytical frameworks are, they largely fail to acknowledge how, in what Beck (1999) dubs world risk society, the uneven production and distribution of climate risks constitute a distinct layer of transnational inequalities in its own right, tying together the fate of cities in new ways. Simplifying a bit, we may distinguish here between local, national, (world) regional and global frames of sustainability-related inequality, corresponding both to epistemological frames on the part of research and to symbolic frames active in urban contestation (Beck, 2010). Empirical analysis of national and regional dimensions to Nordhavn’s climate-related gentrifying processes is beyond the scope of this commentary, and I will focus below on how local and global scales interact, taking Surat as my counterpoint. However, it is relevant to briefly suggest some directions for future research. Hence, for instance, we can ask: to what extent is environmental gentrification in Copenhagen linked also to widening national inequalities in the distribution of privileges? Such questions form part of the so-called Yellow Vest protests in Paris, which have served to expose a set of urban–rural infrastructural inequalities as well as to more generally pose questions about just transitions towards low(er)-carbon sustainability. Similarly, future research should think about European inequalities widening, for instance, around the differential exposure to various climatically induced risks in a NorthernEuropean city like Copenhagen compared, say, with Southern-European cities like Madrid or Athens suffering more strongly from heat-island effects. The global scale arguably forms the more obvious and possibly more important frame of sustainability-related inequality, as standardly cast in urban studies in the language of global North and South. Overall, it will come as no surprise here to assert, as do Beck (2010) and many others (e.g. Faber, 2018), that climate change is inextricably tied to intense and widening global socio-material inequalities. After all, the very structure of the problem is such that fossil fuel-based, highconsumption lifestyles in the urbanised global North have historically contributed disproportionately to a problem which, initially at least, shows its most detrimental consequences to livelihoods and survivability chances amongst vulnerable populations in the global South. One need only think, for instance, of increased flooding in Bangladesh or intensified famine in sub-Saharan Africa to grasp the unequal interrelatedness at work. What is perhaps more difficult to grasp and specify is all the ways in which this realisation of new global, risk-based interconnections and inequalities is or might become relevant and important to how we think about environmental gentrification in a place like Nordhavn. To begin with, we might wonder about the extent to which such a global frame of reference, or what activists would call ‘global climate justice’, has formed part of the planning trajectory and critical local debates around the project. According to my own inquiries (Blok and Meilvang, 2015), the answer would be: only to a very limited extent, if at all. We can also think of this in more strictly materialist terms, however. To the extent that Nordhavn is part of realising Copenhagen’s wider carbon neutral or at least lower-carbon ambitions, then the project does indeed speak to questions of what a globally fair green transition might mean. In other words, given historical responsibilities, this would mean for a wealthy, privileged city like Copenhagen to leverage its technical and financial capacities to forge localised pathways to ambitious decarbonisation (see Beck and Blok, 2016). This then also leads us to the realisation that the various frames of inequality, from the localised to the globalised, do not quite add up in this case. What is locally experienced as low-carbon gentrification, intensifying urban socio-material inequalities via greening measures, is globally part of addressing, in however inadequate ways, the widening inequalities wrought by climate change. There is no contradiction in this, of course – only a perhaps somewhat ‘inconvenient’ realisation that socio-environmental distribution issues are ambivalent and multi-layered. Also, I would certainly not want to suggest that lower-carbon policies in Nordhavn or Copenhagen are being driven in any significant sense by moral concerns for the plight of vulnerable populations in the global South. They are more realistically thought of, arguably, as driven by a combination of parochial green-tech business opportunities, policy concern for eco-branding and profession-led visions of what constitutes today ‘advanced’ forms of eco-urbanism, with potentials for symbolic recognition amongst globalised urban design elites (Anderberg and Clark, 2013; Beck and Blok, 2016). Nevertheless, in a version of Beck’s (1999) side-effect principle, the net result may embody a small step whereby wealthy inhabitants in Nordhavn inadvertently assume a bit of global carbon responsibility. Surat, India: Re-thinking green gentrifications from the South? By itself, such a conclusion would be incomplete, however, if it were not tempered by a better-grounded view of the kinds of sociomaterial vulnerabilities presently faced by urban populations in the global South in the wake of climate change. Indeed, it would be incomplete without the Beckian realisation that such vulnerabilities, as experienced in places like Surat, express in part the logic of climate risk exports from Northern settings like Copenhagen, thereby tying together cities that may otherwise seem unrelated or unconnected. Part of this, moreover, will be to note how Southern cities like Surat may themselves exhibit traits of local green gentrification processes, albeit differently from the global North (Anguelovski et al., 2016). This kind of twinned local–global attention, as Ulrich Beck (2010) emphasises via his notion of methodological cosmopolitanism, is part of what climate change is forcing upon our social thinking and analysis. Here, even when doing situated urban studies, we are no longer free to stick only to localised frames of reference when asking questions about socio-material inequalities. Instead, we need to also move across world-regional and global inequalities, while paying attention to the risk-based interconnectedness of these sites and scales. Such, indeed, is the backdrop to my own ethnographic studies of climate adaptation interventions in the North-West Indian city of Surat back in 2011 (see Blok, 2016, for more details). I will deploy this work here to render my argument tangible, even as I acknowledge that more recent initiatives, including Surat’s participation in the Government of India’s smart cities mission, might add further critical perspectives. From 2008 to 2014, Surat was a pilot city for the Rockefeller Foundation’s Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network (or ACCCRN), which focused mainly on improving the city’s flood risk management approaches. What became immediately clear to me on the ground, and which the research of Eric Chu and others has similarly confirmed (Anguelovski et al., 2016), was that the planning processes involved largely omitted any meaningful participation of marginalised communities in the city. Most notably, this was true of the approximately 400 slum communities of mainly migrant labourers living under high exposure to flood and vector-borne diseases. In the language of Isabelle Anguelovski and co-authors’ (2016) study of the equity impacts of land use planning for climate adaptation in eight cities (Surat included), this amounts to an ‘act of omission’ (2016: 344) with clear embedded injustice implications akin to those located in the green gentrification literature overall. For Surat in particular, they argue, such unequal outcomes were shaped by the heavy involvement of private sector interests in the ACCCRN, symbolised not only by Rockefeller itself but also by the dominant role assumed locally by business consortia capable of steering the deployment of technical consultants. Here, evidently, the key mechanisms shaping environmental privilege and dispossession in Surat differ markedly from those at work in Copenhagen, based as they are more strongly on local–global capital-dominated alliances and shaped by an ‘informalised’ (Roy, 2009) planning regime rather than strongly state-led urban development. Similarly, the forms of neoliberalisation at work differ starkly, not least when it comes to the much less prominent role of environmental relative to developmentalist objectives in Surat’s strivings for sustainability. Still, beyond Anguelovski and co-authors (2016), thinking through the two cities’ joint but unequal embedding into new climatic riskscapes (Blok, 2016), informed by and furthering Beck’s work, helps push green gentrification research in new directions. One specific intervention where these entangled processes came to a head was the design competition for affordable, floodresilient housing in the peri-urban site of Ichappore, halfway between the historic city centre and the chemical industries sitting in Hazira, at the mouth of the river Tapi flowing into the Arabian Sea. While known as Surat Safe Habitat, and targeted at vulnerable groups, to the city’s scene of justice activists and professionals it also exposed the inadequacies of the ACCCRN’s approach (Blok, 2016). Most importantly, these voices argued, this intervention served in fact to entrench ongoing privatisation trends in redirecting infrastructure towards the economically important, ‘Western’-based multinational petrochemical industries which have been attracted to the city by favourable tax-exemption schemes, part of Gujarat’s brand of neoliberalism. Local pollution from these industries poses very tangible health risks to migrant workers forced to live nearby, in ways that the Surat Safe Habitat project would not address. Moreover, and important for my argument, the way these chemical industries now literally occupy areas of the river’s floodplain in itself accounts for part of recent years’ increase in flood risks for the city as a whole. This was dramatically displayed when, in 2006, the release of water from the upstream Ukai dam during the monsoon season served to inundate major parts of the city for days, with attendant and unequally distributed damages to vulnerable populations living in sub-standard housing along the riverside. In other words, while climate-driven impacts on monsoon precipitation are widely acknowledged in Surat civic and professional circles as exacerbating future flood risks, present-day risks stem in equal or perhaps greater measure from haphazard, industrydominated, neoliberal forms of urban ‘development’ as usual (to use the much-contested term) (see Roy, 2009). In fact, for local elites to evoke the changing climate as the core culprit behind such processes would amount, to the civic and professional critics I interviewed, to an act of attempting to absolve themselves from justified blame, a kind of ‘climate-washing’ (Blok, 2016). Still, the same critics would insist that impinging realities of climate change, as set amidst global inequalities for which ‘the West’ holds primary responsibility, would gradually add to already troublesome and unjust local development trajectories. In this sense, I argue, the Surat Safe Habitat intervention and the wider ACCCRN adaptation process in Surat, with all its in-built inequities, well illustrate Ulrich Beck’s (2010) core point about the ways in which climate change radicalises and globalises social inequalities, as it ties together the fates of populations living worlds apart; the fates, for instance, of the wealthy inhabitants in Nordhavn and the poor migrants in Ichappore. Here, it is not simply that climate adaptation in the urbanised South easily represents a ‘double’ climate injustice, given that disadvantaged groups in places like Surat contributed the least to global carbon emissions, even while they are also being excluded from the benefits of climate adaptation action. This double injustice, we might say, is the face of local green gentrification in places like Surat, where a growing middle class accrues socio-environmental privileges at the expense of the urban poor, in part by literally elevating their homes above flood risks (Beck and Blok, 2016). More radically, however, it is that climate change, understood globally, exacerbates already existing, multi-scalar forms of inequalities, thereby forming, in Beck’s (2010: 173) words, a new ‘fatal conjunction of poverty, social vulnerability, corruption, accumulation of dangers, and loss of dignity’. This fatal conjunction, for which I offer Ichappore as contingent illustration, is what happens at the intersection of local, national, (world) regional and global processes of socio-material inequalities in an unequal world of climate change – a matter, ultimately, of unequal distributions of survival chances. This is also the context for understanding why Beck (2010) spent time in his late career arguing that, in the face of climate change, the notion of ‘social class’ was becoming too parochial and in any case inadequate for understanding radicalised inequalities. If anything, he suggested, we would have to speak here of both localised and globalised ‘risk classes’, defined by their relation to the inequities and privileges generated vis-a-vis various climate- and environment-induced risks. Juxtaposing Nordhavn and Ichappore, Copenhagen and Surat, as I have done in this short commentary, is well suited to bringing out such emerging realities of urban risk classes, whose local–global landscapes of privilege and dispossession deserve more study.

1. Charles Darwin, “The Origin of Species” [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. David Brooks, “The Nuclear Family Was a Mistake,” March 2020, The Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/03/the-nuclear-family-was-a-mistake/605536/ [↑](#footnote-ref-2)